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The federal courts long have recognized the nation's college
campuses as uniquely a "marketplace of ideas."' With their aims of
cultivating curiosity, creativity, and experimentation, colleges and uni-
versities throughout the country have broadly embraced the First
Amendment. 2 At times, however, the free expression rights embodied
in the First Amendment have clashed with administrative attempts to
restrict the speech of college students. One such conflict erupted in
1994 at Kentucky State University (KSU or the "University"), when of-
ficials confiscated an estimated 2000 copies of the student yearbook
because of objections to the content and quality of the publication.
3
In the lawsuit arising from the censorship, Kincaid v. Gibson, two
KSU students claimed that the University violated their First Amend-
ment rights.4 The suit went through a winding procedural history,5
1 B.A. 1999, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Pennsyl-
vania.
The "marketplace of ideas" concept in federal court jurisprudence can be traced
to Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States. See 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes,J, dissenting) ("(T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas--.., the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market .... ).
The First Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
4 Id.
5 The Sixth Circuit first decided a related suit based on the same facts under the
name Cullen v. Gibson, 124 F.3d 197, No. 96-6116, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33186 (6th
Cir.) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1117 (1998). For
more explanation of the Cullen case, see infra note 127.
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including an unreported district court opinion 6 affirmed by a Sixth
Circuit panel.7 The full Sixth Circuit, however, vacated the panel de-
cision,8 and after rehearing the case en banc, reversed the district
court.9 The standard the district court and the Sixth Circuit panel
applied in Kincaid has caused alarm for student free speech advocates.
Prior to these later-overturned Kincaid decisions, that standard, enun-
ciated in the seminal First Amendment case of Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier,'o had been applied only to certain speech in public ele-
mentary, middle, and high schools. The district court and the Sixth
Circuit panel, however, extended the restrictive Hazelwood standard to
certain speech at public colleges and universities. While the full Sixth
Circuit rejected that analysis, the fear still exists that other courts may
again attempt to extend the Hazelwood standard.
Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate "school-sponsored"
speech, such as student publications, so long as the regulations "are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."11 The Court's
reasoning in Hazelwood includes a public forum analysis, which federal
courts often invoke to determine the scope of First Amendment rights
in contexts involving public property." Were the Hazelwood standard
applied to public colleges and universities, the federal courts would
drastically deviate from their long-standing tradition of recognizing
the nation's campuses as a "marketplace of ideas."
Given the potential for such a deviation, this Comment argues
that the Hazelwood standard should not, as a matter of law and policy,
apply to public college campuses. Part I discusses the current free
speech rights granted to public school students, including an exami-
nation of Hazelwood and related cases. Part II addresses the broader
First Amendment rights that the federal courts historically have
6 Kincaid v. Gibson, No. 95-98 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1997), http://www.spic.org/
lawlibrary.asp?id=1 7.
7 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999).
8 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
9 See 236 F.3d at 344 (determining that KSU officials violated the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights). After the en banc ruling, the University and the plaintiffs settled
the case. Student Press Law Center, News Rash: Background on Kincaid v. Gibson, at
http://www.splc.org/kincaidbackground.asp (last modified Mar. 1, 2000). As part of
the settlement, the University agreed to release the yearbooks and to attempt to dis-
tribute them to former students. Id. The University also agreed to pay the student
plaintiffs $5000 each and attorney fees of $60,000. Id.
10 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
11 Id. at 273.
12 Id. at 267 ("We deal first with the question whether Spectrum may appropriately
be characterized as a forum for public expression.").
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granted to college students. Part II also includes a description of the
facts and decisions in Kincaid v. Gibson. In Part III, this Comment
provides several reasons not to extend Hazelwood to college campuses.
Finally, Part IV touches upon the likelihood that the Supreme Court
could in fact apply Hazelwood to college and university students.
The Supreme Court, indeed, has not foreclosed the possibility of
extending Hazelwood tocolleges. In Hazelwood, the Court explicitly left
open that possibility, stating, "We need not now decide whether the
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-
sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level."
13 In
examining the Supreme Court's open question, this Comment makes
certain assumptions. First, it acknowledges that the Hazelwood stan-
dard, if it were extended to colleges, could apply only to public col-
leges, because, absent other factors mentioned below, the First
Amendment applies only to governmental acts. As a result, private
colleges and universities for the most part are, and would continue to
be, free from following these First Amendment standards.1
4 Second,
this Comment assumes that college speech that could be restricted
under Hazelwood otherwise could not be restricted under current First
Amendment standards, such as those regulating obscenity or prohibit-
ing speech that may incite imminent lawful action.'' Finally, the
Comment assumes that the Hazelwood standard as it currently applies• 16
to secondary schools is an appropriate 
standard.
13 Id. at 274 n.7.
14 See, e.g., Grossner v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) ("[R]eceipt of money from the State is not, without a good deal more, enough
to make the [university] an agency or instrumentality of the government."). But see
Braden v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that a state gov-
ernment's role in a private university, including through funding and oversight meas-
ures, transformed the university into a state actor); Isaacs v. Bd. of Trs. of Temple
Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (finding that a private university was a state ac-
tor in part because it received some government funding); Student Press Law Center,
Private Schools and Press Freedom, at http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=8 (1995)
(noting that a court may protect free speech on a private college campus when "the
school is heavily dependent on the state for its existence, relying on infusions of public
money, financing and other viable means of support").
5 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973) (delineating the extent to
which obscene expression may be regulated); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (discussing decisions that allow regulation of speech that "is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
16 In fact, many scholars rightly have argued that the Hazelwood standard is itself
flawed and that public school students should have broader First Amendment rights.
See, e.g., Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual De-
velopment, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1342 (1991) ("The prevailing Supreme Court under-
standing of the educational mission of the schools as inculcation fails to adequately
2002]
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I. PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The First Amendment free speech rights of students in secondary
schools have been shaped largely by three Supreme Court cases:
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,17 Bethel School District v.
Fraser,1 8 and Hazelwood. While Tinker started from the premise that
"[i] t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,"' 9 the Court has limited those rights sharply in
Fraser and Hazelwood.
A. Supreme Court Standards Applying to Public School Students'
First Amendment Rights
Tinker is the proper starting point for an examination of the First
Amendment rights of public school students. ° The dispute in Tinker
take into account the value of student speech in school settings."); see also Katherine
Lush, Comment, Expanding the Rights of Children in Public Schools, 26 NEW. ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CrV. CONFINEMENT 95, 123 (2000) ("To outright censor a newspaper, as the
principal in the Kuhlmeier case arguably did, sends the wrong message to students
about the role the Constitution and specifically the First Amendment freedoms should
play in their lives.").
17 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
18 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
19 393 U.S. at 506.
20 For more in-depth examinations of Tinker, see Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0.
Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990's, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 379 (1995), discussing the role of Tinker in the development of auton-
omy ideology in public schools; Beverly L. Hall, Parameters of Student Conduct, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 515, 515 (1995), describing how twenty-five years after Tinker "NewYork
City public school educators continue to balance an individual student's rights against
their responsibility to provide all children a safe and orderly environment in which to
learn"; James M. Henderson, Sr., The Public Forum Doctrine in Schools, 69 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 529, 532 (1995), stating that "the principal danger to First Amendment rights
specifically recognized and granted by Tinker is the application of the public forum
doctrine in the school setting"; Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the
Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 421, 425-26 (1995), noting that "[a]lthough
Tinker has never been overruled, its significance has been severely eroded" and "[t] he
legal trend is unmistakably toward increasing deference to the decisions of school ad-
ministrators"; Elliot M. Mincberg, A Practical Approach to Tinker and Its Progeny, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 519 (1995), explaining what a practitioner can do when he wants to
maximize students' rights under Tinker and subsequent cases; Michael Rebell, Tinker,
Hazelwood and the Remedial Role of the Courts in Education Litigation, 69 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 539, 549 (1995), proposing that courts, in deciding issues such as those in Tinker,
should bring "a broad representative group of people from the affected community
together, and set up a special master, a facilitator, or some representative of the court,
as a liaison between the community and the court to ensure that there is a proper dia-
logue"; and Mark G. Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression,
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arose when three students in Des Moines, Iowa, wore black armbands
to school to protest the Vietnam War. When the schools' principals
got wind of the plan, they adopted a policy that any student wearing
22
an armband would be asked to remove it or face suspension. Aware
of the policy, the students wore their armbands to school, resulting in
suspensions until they agreed to return without their armbands. 2
Claiming a violation of their First Amendment rights, the students
sued .24
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court found a First Amendment
violation. The Court recognized that First Amendment rights must be
balanced, "in light of the special characteristics of the school envi-
ronment,"21 with the rights of school officials "to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools."2 6 Weighing these conflicting propositions,
the Court held that student speech may only be regulated if it "would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students."
27
Applying this standard, the Court found no evidence of disrup-
tion.2 The Court noted, for example, that "[o]nly a few of the 18,000
69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 365, 377 (1995), explaining subsequent cases that redefined
Tinker and concluding that "the courts need to appreciate the generality of Tinker, and
they need to appreciate the detail of Hazelwood." Further discussion of Tinker may be
found in Edgar Bittle, The Tinker Case: Reflections Thirty Years Later, 48 DRAKE L. REV.
491, 506 (2000), concluding that Justice Black's dissent in Tinker has become the ma-
jority view in light of Fraser and Hazelwood, and because violence in schools has "tilted
the balance of the scales of justice toward more deference to disciplinary actions by
school authority"; Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at
the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker', 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 530 (2000), review-
ing caselaw since Tinker and concluding that "[t]he judiciary's unquestioning accep-
tance of the need for deference to school authority leaves relatively little room for pro-
tecting students' constitutional rights"; Kay S. Hymowitz, Tinker and the Lessons from the
Slippery Slope, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 547, 565 (2000), stating that "anticultural assumptions
behind decisions like... Tinker, far from advancing freedom, threaten its founda-
tions"; and Dan L. Johnston, What the Pigeons Have Done to My Statue, 48 DRAKE L. REV.
519, 526 (2000), discussing how Tinker continues to "empower[] and encourage[] free
women and men among America's students, educators, and in its judiciary" to embrace
the classroom as a "marketplace of ideas."




25 Id. at 506.
26 Id. at 507.
27 Id. at 509.
28 Id. In dissent, Justice Black reached the opposite conclusion. Justice Black ar-
gued that the determination of what speech should be tolerated in secondary schools
should be left to the individual schools, and not to the courts. See id. at 515 (Black, J.,
19192002]
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students in the school system wore the black armbands," and "[o]nly
five students were suspended." 29 Highlighting the constitutional im-
portance of free speech, the Court stated:
In our system, students may not be regarded as closed circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of ex-
30pression of their views.
The broad free speech rights granted to public school students
under Tinker began facing restrictions with the Supreme Court's Fraser
decision nearly two decades later. In Fraser, the Court considered the
free speech rights of a public high school student who had delivered a
sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly.3' After the stu-
dent, Matthew N. Fraser, delivered his speech, he faced suspension for
violating a school policy prohibiting the use of obscene language. 2
Fraser served a two-day suspension and filed suit.
3
dissenting) ("The Court's holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely
new era in which the power to control pupils... is in ultimate effect transferred to the
Supreme Court."). Justice Black also asserted that the wearing of armbands in fact
caused disruptions in the schools. See id. at 517-18 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that
the armbands "took the students' minds off their classwork and diverted them to
thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war").Id. at 508.
30 Id. at 511. The lower federal courts have followed Tinker in some instances and
strayed from it in others. As Chemerinsky explains:
There are literally dozens of lower federal court cases over the last thirty years
dealing with student speech. They follow no consistent pattern; some are
quite speech-protective and follow Tinkers philosophy as well as its holding,
while others are very restrictive of student speech and treat Tinker as if it has
been overruled.
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 542.
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986).
32 Id. Fraser's speech was as follows:I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel,
is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-
he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote forJeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and
the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan,J., concurring).
33 Id. at 678-79.
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The Supreme Court upheld Fraser's punishment by a 7-2 decision,
and distinguished Tinker by noting that the expression in Tinker could
not be construed as associated with the school, while Fraser's speech
was given as part of an official school activity.
4 The Court further dis-
tinguished the speech in Tinker as "political" speech, thus reasoning
that the Tinker standard need not apply to nonpolitical speech such as
Fraser's. Rather, the Court emphasized that "schools must teach by
example the shared values of a civilized social order" and, as a result,
can prohibit "lewd, indecent, or offensive 
speech."3 6
The Court used similar reasoning two years later in Hazelwood.
7
While not explicitly overruling Tinker, the Court, in a 5-3 decision, de-
veloped a far more stringent First Amendment standard for certain
public school speech. Of concern to the Court was the decision by
the principal of Hazelwood East High School to censor two pages of
an issue of the school's student newspaper, Spectrum.
35  The newspa-
per, produced as part of a journalism course, was subsidized largely
with funds from the school district and was subject to various oversight
mechanisms.3 9 When the newspaper staff submitted proofs of the is-
sue to the principal, he ordered the removal of two articles, one de-
scribing three Hazelwood East students' experiences with pregnancy,
and the other discussing the impact of divorce on students at the
school.4o
Adopting a public forum analysis, the Supreme Court held that
the principal's actions did not violate the students' First Amendment
rights.4 ' While the Court acknowledged the broad First Amendment
34 See id. at 685-86 ("A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually
explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.
Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself .... ").
35 See id. at 680 (noting the "marked distinction between the political 'message' of
the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case").
36 Id. at 683. The Court found ample evidence that Fraser's speech was offensive:
"The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly offensive to both teach-
ers and students-indeed to any mature person." Id.
37 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
38 Id. at 262.
89 Id.
40 Id. at 263. The principal voiced several concerns, such as criticism of a father in
the divorce article and the potential that the girls in the pregnancy article could be
identified despite the use of false names. Id. The pages containing the pregnancy and
divorce articles also included articles on teenage marriage, runaways, and juvenile de-
linquents, as well as a general piece on teenage pregnancy. Id. at 264 n.1. Although
the principal had no objection to these articles, they too were omitted. Id.
41 Id. at 276.
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rights granted in Tinker, it also recognized both the restrictions placed
on those rights in Fraser and the need for schools to instill civic values
in students. 42 In reaching its conclusion, the Court determined that
the school newspaper could not be considered a public forum.43 In
previous cases, the Court found three types of forums, each of which
has its own First Amendment standards. In a traditional public forum,
such as a public park,44 the government has a very limited ability to
limit free speech rights. Only those restrictions that are narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling state interest will pass First Amendment
45scrutiny. On the opposite end are nonpublic forums, such as mili-
46 a 47.tary bases and prisons, in which the government may impose exten-
sive restrictions on First Amendment rights, so long as the restrictions
are reasonable. 48  Finally, in the middle are limited public forums,
where the government's rights are as limited as those in a public fo-
rum once it is determined that the government has opened up the fo-
rum for expressive use. 49
Applying this analysis, the Court in Hazelwood stated that "school
facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities
have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscrimi-
nate use by the general public."' 50 The Court explained that "'[t]he
government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permit-
42 See id. at 266-67 (discussing First Amendment law in light of Tinker and Fraser).
43 See id. at 267 ("The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets,
parks, and other traditional public forums that 'time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."' (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939))).
44 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)
("Public streets and parks fall into this category [of traditional public forums].").
45 See id. at 800 ("[S]peakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest.").
46 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (determining that military bases,
unlike municipal streets and parks, have not "traditionally served as a place for free
public assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens").
47 SeeJones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 134-36 (concluding
that a "prison is most emphatically not a 'public forum"').
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (stating that if a forum is deemed nonpublic,"school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teach-
ers, and other members of the school community").
49 See id. (noting that a government creates a limited public forum "'only by inten-
tionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse"' (quoting Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 802)). For a detailed discussion of the public forum doctrine, see infra Part
II.C.
50 484 U.S. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
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ting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontradi-
tional forum for public discourse.' 51 With this public forum standard
established, the Court turned to the intent of Hazelwood East officials.
First, the Court noted that Spectrum's purpose was largely educational,
in part because it was produced by a journalism class taught by a fac-
ulty member during regular class hours and for 
academic credit.52
The Court also emphasized that the course's teacher had significant
involvement in the newspaper's production, ranging from the selec-
tion of editors to the editing of stories." The Court found additional
evidence insufficient to show that the school intended Spectrum to be a
public forum. 4 For example, a policy statement published in an issue
of Spectrum, declaring that "Spectrum, as a student-press publication,
accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment," did not reflect an
intent of the school's administration to expand students' free speech
rights by converting the newspaper into a public forum.
5
The Court then proceeded to distinguish Tinker on the grounds
that the speech in Tinker was personal while the speech in Hazelwood
was "school-sponsored."5 6 Addressing the distinction, the Court stated:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second
form of student expression [school-sponsored speech] to assure that
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropri-
ate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, a school
may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a
school play "disassociate itself," [Bethel Sch. Dist. v. ]Fraser, 478 U.S. [ 675,]
51 Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985)).
52 See id. at 268 (stating that, pursuant to school policy, production of Spectrum was
part of the educational curriculum and was a regular classroom activity). The Hazel-
wood East Curriculum Guide described the course in which Spectrum was produced,
Journalism II, as a "laboratory situation in which the students publish the school news-
paper applying skills they have learned in Journalism I." Id.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 269-70 (dismissing the evidence relied on by the appellate court in
finding Spectrum to be a public forum).
5 Id. at 269. The Court also found unconvincing the fact that students had some
editorial control over Spectrum, reasoning that such responsibility was merely in line
with the educational objectives of the course. Id. at 270. Additionally, a school policy
stating that the school would not restrict the First Amendment rights of student publi-
cations was offset by another school policy statement that such publications were "de-
veloped within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications." Id. at 269.
Id. at 271. School-sponsored speech, the Court noted, could include speech in
student publications, theatrical productions, and other similar expressive activities that
"the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." Id.
192320021
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685 [(1986)], not only from speech that would "substantially interfere
with [its] work... or impinge upon the rights of other students," Tinker
[ v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S.[ 503,] 509[ (1969)], but also
from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inade-
quately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuit-
able for immature audiences.
The Court also emphasized that schools must consider the matur-
ity of the audience exposed to the student speech and must perform
their role as one of the principal instruments in instilling cultural val-ues in " 58
ues in children. With such principles in mind, the Court announced
a new standard for evaluating the constitutionality of "school-
sponsored" speech, such as that found in Hazelwood, holding that
"educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
''
511
With this new standard in hand, the Court found that Hazelwood
East's principal acted reasonably in censoring Spectrum.Go Addressing
the potential identification of the girls in the pregnancy article, the
Court stated that the principal "could reasonably have feared that the
article violated whatever pledge of anonymity had been given to the
pregnant students. "6 In addition, the principal reasonably could have
believed that the "frank talk" on sexual topics in the pregnancy article
"was inappropriate in a school-sponsored publication distributed to
14-year-old freshmen and presumably taken home to be read by stu-
dents' even younger brothers and sisters.,6
57 Id.
58 Id. at 272.
59 Id. at 273. The Court also stated, "This standard is consistent with our oft-
expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility
of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges." Id.
60 Id. at 276.
61 Id. at 274.
62 Id. at 274-75. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun, reached the opposite conclusion. Justice Brennan argued that free
expression serves important interests in the education of children. Id. at 277 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). While acknowledging that schools are responsible for instilling
cultural values in children,Justice Brennan stated, "We have not, however, hesitated to
intervene where their decisions run afoul of the Constitution." Id. at 279 (Brennan,J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan also expressed concern over schools that oppose student
expression, even when it does not interfere with the school's functioning, merely be-
cause it conflicts with the school's message. Id. at 279-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
After rejecting the majority's standard and applying the Tinker standard, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the principal's censorship was clearly unconstitutional. See id. at
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B. Public School Students'Free Speech Rights in the Lower Federal Courts
The lower federal courts and most state courts have applied the
Hazelwood standard faithfully. Consequently, student speech is now
63
significantly circumscribed in the federal courts. Indeed, the courts
rarely find against schools in student free speech cases, notwithstand-
ing the variety of contexts in which they are brought.64 The Third Cir-
289-90 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("Since the censorship served no legitimate pedagogi-
cal purpose, it cannot by any stretch of the imagination have been designed to prevent
'materia[l] disrup[tion of] classwork'..... (alteration in original) (quoting Tinker,
393 U.S. at 513)). In sweeping language, Justice Brennan prefaced his dissent by stat-
ing, "When the young men and women of Hazelwood East High School registered for
Journalism II, they expected a civics lesson." Id. at 277 (Brennan, J. dissenting). He
concluded his dissent in much the same way: "The young men and women of Hazel-
wood East expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today." Id.
at 291 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
63 See, e.g., Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1532-37 (E.D. Va. 1992) (up-
holding the suspension of a middle school student who wore a shirt stating "Drugs
Suck!" in school); DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 748-52 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (finding that a teacher did not violate a second-grade student's First Amend-
ment rights when the teacher prohibited the student from showing the class a video-
tape of herself singing a religious song), affd, I F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1993); Duran v.
Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that a school did not violate
the First Amendment rights of a fifth-grade student when it prohibited her from dis-
tributing a religious survey at school), vacated, 972 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir. 1992). But see
McIntire v. Bethel Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 804 F. Supp. 1415, 1424 (W.D. Okla.
1992) (finding that students' T-shirts stating "[t]he best of the night's adventures are
reserved for people with nothing planned" were protected by the First Amendment);
Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (declining to apply the
Hazelwood standard to a high school extracurricular student newspaper).
See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 20, at 396-97 ("Although there are exceptions,
most lower courts have read Hazelwood as clarifying educators' authority to control stu-
dent expression for the sake of preserving the institutional and educational integrity of
public schools. These courts have also chosen to extend Hazelwood's application be-
yond student newspaper cases and even student speech cases." (footnote omitted)). As
Dan Johnston summarized:
Federal courts since Tinker have upheld the disciplining of public school
students for the content of speeches during an election campaign for student
council president, for the content of a student's valedictory speech, for select-
ing "The Power of God" as a topic for a classroom presentation, for wanting to
show a video tape of a religious song in class "show and tell," for wearing a
shirt with an anti-drug message, and for wearing t-shirts protesting school
policies.
Johnston, supra note 20, at 520 (footnotes omitted). Before Hazelwood, the lower fed-
eral courts, in line with Tinker, granted far greater First Amendment rights to public
school students. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that school officials violated the free speech rights of students by punishing
them for producing a satirical publication largely off school grounds). But see Seyfried
v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 215-17 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding no First Amendment violation
when a high school principal cancelled a dramatic production because of its sexual
19252002]
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cuit, for example, indicated in Brody v. Spang that a public high school
graduation ceremony is unlikely to be considered a public forum.5
The court followed Hazelwood because the "process for setting the
format and contents of a graduation ceremony are more likely to re-
semble the tightly controlled school newspaper policies at issue in Ha-
zelwood than the broad group access policies considered in [other
relevant Supreme Court cases] .,66
Even when the expression at issue involves no vocal speech, such
as the attire students wear in school, First Amendment rights in
schools have been curtailed. The Sixth Circuit, for example, upheld a
high school administrator's decision prohibiting a student from wear-
ing Marilyn Manson T-shirts. Applying the tripartite structure of
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, the court found that the shirts were of-
fensive and could cause a substantial disruption in the school, and
thus held that the school constitutionally could prohibit them.68 The
Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Baxter v. Vigo County
School Corp. when it upheld the decision of a school principal who
prohibited a student from wearing shirts with messages such as "Un-.n • 69
fair Grades" and "Racism." The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, granted
broader First Amendment freedom to students when it upheld their
rights to wear buttons in support of striking teachers."
theme).
65 See 957 F.2d 1108, 1117-20 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering to what extent religious
speech may be included in a public high school graduation ceremony). Other circuits
have also addressed First Amendment rights of students at official school events. In
Poling v. Murphy, the Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment did not protect a
high school student who mocked a school official during a campaign speech delivered
at a school assembly. 872 F.2d 757, 758 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Henerey v. City of St.
Charles, Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1133 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a student elec-
tion in a public school "was conducted within the context of a nonpublic forum").
66 957 F.2d at 1119.
67 Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 468-71 (6th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001). Marilyn Manson is a popular hard rock performer known
for his dark lyrics and drug use. Id. at 466. The front of one of the T-shirts depicted a
three-faced Jesus, with the words "See No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth."
Id. at 467. The back displayed the word "BELIEVE," with the letters "LIE" highlighted.
Id. When the student wore the T-shirt to school, an administrator ordered him to turn
the shirt inside out, go home and change, or leave school and be deemed truant. Id.
The student left school but came back the next four school days, each time wearing a
new Marilyn Manson T-shirt. Id.
68 Id. at 469-71.
69 See Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1994) (con-
cluding that the rights the principal allegedly violated were not "clearly established" at
the time and therefore he was entitled to qualified immunity).
70 Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir. 1992). The
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Hazelwood also has come up in the context of school mascots. In
Crosby v. Holsinger, the Fourth Circuit upheld a high school principal's
decision to eliminate 'Johnny Reb" as the school's mascot because it
offended black students and parents. 7 The court held that, under
71
Hazelwood, a school need not associate itself with certain expression.
The court stated:
A school mascot or symbol bears the stamp of approval of the school
itself. Therefore, school authorities are free to disassociate the school
from such a symbol because of educational concerns. Here, Principal
Holsinger received complaints thatJohnny Reb offended blacks and lim-
ited their participation in school activities, so he eliminated the symbol
73based on legitimate concerns.
As the Fourth Circuit's holding thus makes clear, the lower federal
courts freely apply Hazelwood to many forms of speech.
C. Public School Students'Free Speech Rights in the State Courts
In the state courts, meanwhile, public school students' free speech
rights have been limited in some jurisdictions to the same extent as in
the federal courts, while they are broader in other state jurisdictions.'
4
Two states, Arkansas and Kansas, have codified laws that grant public
school student publications broader First Amendment rights than
Ninth Circuit has been less restrictive in its First Amendment analysis than its sister
courts. SeeJohnston, supra note 20, at 520-21 ("Only the Ninth Circuit seems to have
solidly embraced Tinker in reversing the discipline imposed against students for wear-
ing 'scab' buttons during a teacher strike."); see also Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149,
1159 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding unconstitutional a high school policy requiring adminis-
trative prepublication review of non-school-sponsored student-written material).
71 852 F.2d 801, 803 (4th Cir. 1988).
72 See id. at 802 (reaffirming that "school officials need not sponsor or promote all
student speech"). Expression that is religious in nature presents additional particular
difficulties. In such instances, not only must a student overcome Hazelwood, but he also
must confront the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which prohibits state-
sponsored religion. Thus, in Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F.3d 1530, 1532
(7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit considered an elementary school principal's deci-
sion to prohibit a student from giving his classmates invitations to a religious meeting
to be held at a church his family attended. Applying Hazelwood's analysis in determin-
ing that the school was a nonpublic forum, the court found no free speech violation.
Id. at 1539-40. A claim that the school's policy regulating distribution of materials vio-
lated the Establishment Clause was also rejected. Id. at 1543-54.
73 Holsinger, 852 F.2d at 802.
74 The only state court case to rule specifically on the applicability of Hazelwood to
a school-sponsored student newspaper is Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education,
647 A.2d 150, 151-53 (N.J. 1994), finding that school officials' censorship of a student
newspaper failed to meet the Hazelwood standards, thus finding a First Amendment vio-
lation.
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they would be entitled to under Hazelwood.75 Four additional states
have passed laws that not only give broader rights to student publica-
tions, but to all other forms of student expression as well.16 Of those
states, only California had codified the Tinker standard prior to Hazel-
wood.77 Colorado, Iowa, and Massachusetts provide similar free speech
rights for public school students. 78 Two additional states, Pennsylvania
75 In Arkansas, the Arkansas Student Publications Act only prohibits publication of
materials:
(1) ... that are obscene as to minors, as defined by state law;
(2) ... that are libelous or slanderous, as defined by state law;
(3) ... that constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, as defined by state
law; or
(4) ... that so incite students as to create:
(A) [a] clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on
school premises[,] or
(B) [t)he violation of lawful school regulations[,] or
(C) [t]he material and substantial disruption of the orderly operation of
the school.
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-1204 (Michie 1999). Kansas has passed a similar law, the Kan-
sas Student Publications Act, which states in part, "The liberty of the press in student
publications shall be protected. School employees may regulate the number, length,
frequency, distribution and format of student publications. Material shall not be sup-
pressed solely because it involves political or controversial subject matter." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72-1506(a) (1992). The Act further provides that published expression that
"creates material or substantial disruption of the normal school activity is not protected
by this act." Id. § 72-1506(c). This provision essentially codifies the Tinker standard in
lieu of the Hazelwood standard. Holsinger, 852 F.2d at 802.
76 See Student Press Law Center, SPLC Law Library, at http://www.splc.org/
lawlibrary.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2002) (listing California, Colorado, Iowa, and Mas-
sachusetts as having statutes addressing free speech protection in public schools).
77 Hafen & Hafen, supra note 20, at 406 n.149. California's Student Free Expres-
sion Law only restricts expression which is "obscene, libelous, or slanderous" or which
"so incites students as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of unlaw-
ful acts on school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substan-
tial disruption of the orderly operation of the school." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907
(West 1993). The law also provides free expression parameters specifically for student
publications, including the right to be free from prepublication review. Id.; see also
Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 772 (Ct.
App. 1995) ("[T]he California Supreme Court has taken a different approach than the
United States Supreme Court when analyzing the government's ability to regulate the
content of its own sponsored publications."); Leeb v. DeLong, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502
(Ct. App. 1988) (holding that California law allows censorship of a high school news-
paper that may contain defamatory material but does not allow censorship "as a matter
of taste or pedagogy").
78 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-120(2) (2001) ("If a publication written substan-
tially by students is made generally available throughout a public school, it shall be a
public forum for students of such school."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.22 (1996)
("[S]tudents of the public schools have the right to exercise freedom of speech, in-
cluding the right of expression in official school publications."); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
71, § 82 (Law. Co-op. 1991) ("The right of students to freedom of expression in the
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and Washington, have free speech regulations in their administrative
codes.79 Since Hazelwood became law, however, dozens of states have
80considered legislation that would reject its holding. Only a few states
81have passed such legislation into law.
D. Censorship in Secondary Schools
As a result of the Hazelwood decision, secondary schools have cen-
sored student speech far more rampantly in the past decade than in
previous years. According to the Student Press Law Center, a non-
profit organization that provides legal support to public school and
college media, the number of inquiries it receives each year has
soared since the mid 1980s. In 1986, the Center reported hearing of
548 cases of censorship." That statistic nearly tripled to 1588 in
1997.3 In 1999, the number of inquiries to the Center reached 1624.84
Of those inquiries, 367 came from high school journalists or their ad-
visors, an increase of fourteen percent from 1998.85 Mike Hiestand, an
attorney for the Center, attributed the rise in part to the increasing
public schools of the commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right
shall not cause any disruption or disorder within the school.").
79 See 22 PA. CODE § 12.9(b) (1999) ("Students have the right to express them-
selves unless the expression materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process, threatens immediate harm to the welfare of the school or community, en-
courages unlawful activity or interferes with another individual's rights."); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 180-40-215(2) (2001) ("All students possess the constitutional right to
freedom of speech and press... .").
so In the first five years after the Supreme Court issued its Hazelwood decision,
about two dozen states considered legislation addressing students' free speech rights.
Hafen & Hafen, supra note 20, at 406 nn. 150, 151.
81 States that have rejected legislation similar to the California law include Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. Those states typically apply
Hazelwood. See, e.g., Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying Hazelwood to uphold a high school's expulsion of a student who wrote offen-
sive articles for an unofficial student-produced newspaper).
High-School Journalism Censorship on Rise, KANSAS CITY STAR, May 21, 1999, at E8.
83 Id.
84 High School Censorship Calls Up Again in 1999, in STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER
REPORT, Fall 2000, at 3 [hereinafter 1999 Censorship], available at http://www.splc.org/
report-detail.asp?id=401&edition=4 . That number soared even higher in 2000, to
2129. High School Censorship Calls Soar in 2000, in STUDENT PRESS LAw CENTER REPORT,
Fall 2001, at 3 [hereinafter 2000 Censorship], available at http://www.splc.org/
report.detail.asp?id=697&edition=19.
85 1999 Censorship, supra note 84. The 367 inquiries in 1999 marked the fifth
straight year with an increase in the number of inquiries from high school journalists
and advisors. Id. The number rose dramatically to 518 in 2000. 2000 Censorship, supra
note 84.
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tenacity of student journalists. "Students are now writing more hard-
hitting stories, and administrations seem to be cracking down on
them," Hiestand said. "They're not just writing about football games
and proms anymore."
86
One such instance arose in State College, Pennsylvania, in 1998,
when a high school newspaper sought to publish a controversial story
about students allegedly drinking at the school's homecoming
dance."' The award-winning newspaper, the Lions'Digest, had a history
of publishing probing journalism on such topics as birth control,
drugs, and homosexuality.8 Given that history, the staff was especially
taken aback when the school administration ordered the newspaper
8,)
not to publish its homecoming story.' The administration claimed
protection of students' privacy; the newspaper cried censorship.9 °
Whatever the reason, the story was killed.9' "I guess I've learned that,
when you look back at all of this, you can't cross the administration,"
said Mike Conti, Jr., then the newspaper's editor-in-chief. "They will
always have the final say." 2 Most federal courts appear to agree.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
The Supreme Court has not addressed the First Amendment pro-
tection attached to "school-sponsored" expression at the college level
since its Hazelwood decision, and indeed, explicitly reserved that ques-
tion in Hazelwood.93 The Court, in a footnote near the end of its deci-
sion, stated: "We need not now decide whether the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive
activities at the college and university level."94 Furthermore, in the
years since Hazelwood no lower court had applied Hazelwood to a col-
lege publication until the courts in Kincaid did. Instead, the federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, generally have recognized
broader First Amendment rights at the college level, both before and
after Hazelwood.
86 High-School Journalism Censorship on Rise, supra note 82.
87 Vicki Cheng, State College, Pa., High School Newspaper Story on Drinking Killed,






93 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988).
94 Id.
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A. Supreme Court Consideration of First Amendment Rights
on College Campuses
The starting point for an examination of college-level First
Amendment jurisprudence is the 1972 case of Healy v. James, in which
the Supreme Court considered a college president's rejection of a
student application to form a local chapter of Students for a Demo-
cratic Society at Central Connecticut State College. 95 In rejecting the
application, the president found that "the organization's philosophy
was antithetical to the school's policies, and that the group's inde-
pendence was doubtful."96 In considering the dispute, the Supreme
Court stated, "At the outset we note that state colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First 
Amendment."97
The Court then explicitly rejected the notion that First Amendment
rights should be different on college campuses than they are in the
community at large and thus held that the students' free association
and free expression rights were violated.98 The Court found the
president's concern that the organization would cause disruptions on
campus unpersuasive, citing a lack of evidence in support of the
president's contention."
One year later, the Supreme Court in Papish v. Board of Curators of
the University of Missouri reaffirmed the broad First Amendment rights
it set forth in Healy, holding that the University of Missouri could not
expel a graduate student for distributing on campus a newspaper she
produced with classmates.19 The newspaper contained two pieces to
which the university objected: a political cartoon depicting policemen
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess ofJustice, and an article
entitled "Motherfucker Acquitted."' °' Because of those pieces, the
student who distributed the newspaper was expelled pursuant to a
university policy prohibiting "indecent conduct or speech." 2 In hold-
ing that the university violated the student's First Amendment rights,
95 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972).
96 Id. at 175 (citation omitted).
97 Id. at 180.
98 See id. at 187 ("The mere disagreement of the President with the group's phi-
losophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may
have been, especially to one with PresidentJames' responsibility, the mere expression
of them would notjustify the denial of First Amendment rights.").
.9 Id. at 188-91.
100 410 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1973).
1 Id. at 667.
102 Id. at 668.
19312002]
1932 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1915
the Court stated, "We think Healy makes it clear that the mere dis-
semination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a
state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'con-
ventions of decency.' 10 3 The Court further stated that the objection-
able pieces were not legally obscene and that "the First Amendment
leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic
community with respect to the content of speech."0 4
B. First Amendment Rights on College Campuses in the Lower Federal Courts
While the Supreme Court's consideration of First Amendment
rights on college campuses following Healy and Papish has focused
largely on other issues, including cases of religious rights and free as-
sociation rights, the lower federal courts also have addressed the mat-
ter, most recently in Kincaid v. Gibson.' Prior to Hazelwood, the lower
federal courts recognized First Amendment rights for college students
to the same broad extent as the Supreme Court did in Healy and Pa-
pish106 For example, in Stanley v. Magrath, the Eighth Circuit held that
the University of Minnesota could not restrict university funding pro-
103 Id. at 670. The Court in Hazelwood distinguished the newspaper at issue in Pa-
pish from the newspaper at issue in Hazelwood because the Papish newspaper was an off-
campus "underground" publication. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 & n.3. Although the
University of Missouri allowed the newspaper to be distributed on campus, that per-
mission did not rise to the level of school-sponsored speech. Id.
104 Papish, 410 U.S. at 670-71.
05 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001). Supreme Court cases involving other First
Amendment issues on college campuses include Board of Regents of the University of Wis-
consin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000), holding that the University of
Wisconsin's mandatory student activities fee did not violate the First Amendment free
association rights of students who opposed funding of certain student groups; Rosenber-
ger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 84546 (1995), holding
that the University of Virginia's refusal to fund the printing of students' religious
newspaper violated the students' free speech rights and was not excused by the Estab-
lishment Clause; and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981), holding that the
University of Missouri's refusal to grant a student religious group access to university
facilities generally open to other student groups was an unconstitutional content-based
exclusion of religious speech.
106 Pre-Hazelwood cases in the lower courts dealing with college students' First
Amendment rights include Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1987); Missis-
sippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976);Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d
456 (4th Cir. 1973); and Bazaarv. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, modified, 489 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1973). Similar cases decided before Healy and Papish include Avins v. Rutgers State Uni-
versity of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D.
Colo. 1971); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308
F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp.
613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot sub nom. Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515
(5th Cir. 1968).
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vided to a student newspaper on the grounds that the newspaper pub-
lished objectionable material.107 Similarly, in Schiff v. Williams, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that Florida Atlantic University could not dismiss
three students from their positions as editors of a student newspaper
because the university was dissatisfied with the quality of the newspa-
108
per.
Following Hazelwood, however, the lower federal courts have not
always been predictable in their application of the case, as most re-
cently evidenced by the conflicting opinions in Kincaid'
09 In Lueth v.
St. Clair County Community College, the Eastern District of Michigan de-
clined to apply Hazelwood to a dispute in which the college's dean re-
fused to allow the student newspaper to publish a particular adver-
tisement. 0 The First Circuit put it more bluntly in Student Government
Ass'n v. Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts, when it stated
that Hazelwood "is not applicable to college newspapers."' By con-
trast, in Bishop v. Aronov, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Hazelwood
public forum analysis to determine that the University of Alabama did
not violate the First Amendment rights of a professor when it prohib-
ited him from making religious statements in class.
112 Ultimately, in
Kincaid, the Eastern District of Kentucky and the Sixth Circuit applied
Hazelwood, for the first time, to college newspapers.
C. Facts of Kincaid v. Gibson
Like many student free speech cases, Kincaid involved a strong
butting of heads between administrators and students. At the time
107 719 F.2d 279, 280 (8th Cir. 1983).
108 519 F.2d 257, 259-61 (5th Cir. 1975).
1o9 See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 20, at 406 ("The Hazelwood Court expressly
stated that it was withholdingjudgment on whether its articulated standards would also
apply in a university setting. Predictably, therefore, lower courts have not consistently
applied Hazelwood in cases involving universities."). According to J. Marc Abrams & S.
Mark Goodman:
Although Kuhlmeier dealt with a school-sponsored newspaper, it also casts un-
certainty upon the status of independently run student newspapers and stu-
dent newspapers at the college level. We will argue that the Kuhlmeier decision
affects neither of these types of newspapers. The first amendment protections
afforded these newspapers retain the vitality derived from the history of stu-
dent press litigation in the past twenty years.
J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press Rights in
the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DuKE L.J. 706, 707.
10 732 F. Supp. 1410, 1414-15 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
11 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989).
112 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-77 (11th Cir. 1991).
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Kentucky State University administrators confiscated approximately
2000 copiesI" of the University's student yearbook, The Thorobred,
Charles Kincaid and Capri Coffer, the plaintiffs in the case, were both
students at the University. 1 14 Funding for both The Thorobred and The
Thorobred News, the student newspaper, came at least partially from the
University.' 5 A mandatory eighty-dollar student activity fee automati-
cally entitled each KSU student to a copy of the yearbook."6 Both
publications were subject to oversight by the University's Student Pub-
lications Board (the "Board"), a panel that included, among others,
the student editors of the The Thorobred and The Thorobred News, the
University's Vice President for Student Affairs, and the Student Publi-
cations Coordinator. 7 At the time of the confiscation, the Board did
not have in effect a policy outlining the scope of the Board's oversight
of student publications. Instead, the University appeared to rely on
a "Student Publications" section of the KSU student handbook. 9
The 1992-94 edition of The Thorobred was under the direction of
1S Student Press Law Center, supra note 9.
Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 722, rev'd on reh'g, 236 F.3d 342, 345 (6th Cir.
2001) (en banc).
11 Id. The yearbooks were paid for with an estimated $9000 in student activity
fees. Student Press Law Center, supra note 9.
16 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 722. For further consideration on the constitutionality of
mandatory student activity fees to fund university activities, see Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
17 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 722. The Board's functions included selecting the editors
and staff for each student publication, arranging seminars for journalism education,
providing the publications with counsel, and approving each publication's written pub-
lications policy. Id. The publications policies addressed such items as purpose, size,
quantity controls, and the time, place, and manner of distribution. Id.
18 Id. The Board subsequently adopted a "Student Publications Board Governing
Policy," which Kincaid and Coffer cited in support of their claims. Id. at 722 n.1.
However, because the policy was not in effect at the time of the confiscation, the court
found that it carried no weight. Id.
19 Id. at 722. Among other provisions, the "Student Publications" section stated:
The Board of Regents respects the integrity of student publications and the
press, and the rights to exist in an atmosphere of free and responsible discus-
sion and of intellectual exploration. The Board expects student editors and
faculty advisors to adhere to high standards of journalistic ethics and the
highest level of good taste and maturity in the integrity, tone and content of
student publications.
Id. The section continued, "Though both publications are subsidized by the Univer-
sity, it is the intent that both shall be as free of censorship as prevailing law dictates."
Id. Finally, the section listed five responsibilities of the Board, outlined two standards
of quality control that the University expected The Thorobred News to maintain, and
concluded with various miscellaneous provisions. Id. at 722-23.
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Coffer.20 Although Coffer initially had supporting help from other
yearbook staff members, those students soon dropped out, leaving
Coffer with the sole responsibility of producing the 12publication.
Coffer selected the yearbook's theme, "Kentucky State: Destination
Unknown," as well as its format, including the use of photographs de-
picting not only life at KSU but also current world events.12
2 Coffer
also selected purple for the yearbook's cover rather than gold and
green, the University's official colors.2 3 When the final copies of the
yearbook arrived at KSU, the University's Vice President for Student
Affairs, defendant Betty Gibson, expressed her displeasure with the
product.2 4 Gibson disliked the yearbook's purple cover, its theme and
tide, the inclusion of pictures unrelated to KSU, the dearth of school-
related photos, and the absence of many photo captions. After con-
sulting with KSU President Mary Smith, Gibson decided not to dis-
tribute the yearbook and eventually planned to have them dis-
carded. 126
120 Id. at 723.
121 Id.
122 Id. Coffer selected the theme, "Kentucky State: Destination Unknown," be-
cause, in her words,
it was a commentary [on] just about everything that was happening at the
University and within the lives of the students.... It was about ... saying
where are we going in our lives.... Destination Unknown, where am I going
to be in five years from now[?] Where am I going to be ten years from now[?]
Id. (alterations in original).
123 Id. Although KSU administrators preferred the use of the University's official
colors for the yearbook, non-University colors had been used in the past. Coffer chose
a non-University color, she said, because "we want[ed] to do something different. We
wanted to bring Kentucky State University into the nineties.... I wanted to present a




126 Id. In addition to the alleged censorship of the yearbook, Kincaid and Coffer
claimed that Gibson had sought to control the content of the student newspaper. Id.
at 724. The students contended that certain comic strips were no longer published
after Gibson criticized them for mocking the administration and aspects of life at KSU.
Id. at 723-24. The students also alleged that in November 1994, Gibson directed the
University's Publications Coordinator, Laura Cullen, to prohibit the newspaper from
printing a particular letter to the editor and to convince the newspaper staff to publish
more positive news. Id. at 724. When Cullen refused, claiming that such moves would
violate the students' First Amendment rights, she was transferred to a position in the
University's Housing Office. Id. After Cullen protested her transfer, she was reinstated
to her position as Publications Coordinator. Id. Accompanying Cullen's reinstatement
was a memorandum from Gibson requiring Cullen to ensure publication of more posi-
tive news, coverage of all campus events, review of the newspaper by the Board, the
meeting of all deadlines, and the monitoring of content for the yearbook. Id.
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KSU's regulation of The Thorobred and The Thorobred News
prompted Kincaid and Coffer to file a lawsuit in November 1995 in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. 2 7
Among other claims, the students alleged that Gibson's interference
with the newspaper and the University's refusal to distribute the year-
book violated their First Amendment free speech, free expression,
and free association rights. Kincaid and Coffer sought both dam-
ages and injunctive relief, including a court order requiring KSU to
distribute the 1992-94 yearbooks and to refrain from further regula-
tion of student publications. 9
Having previously dismissed the plaintiffs' other claims, the dis-
trict court's November 14, 1997, decision considered only the stu-
dents' First Amendment free speech claims as to the yearbook and
newspaper, the breach of contract claim, and the arbitrary and capri-
cious governmental action claim, ruling against the students on each
127 See id. (recounting the unreported prior history of the case); see also Kincaid,
No. 95-98 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1997) (containing the unofficial text of the district court
opinion), http://www.splc.org/law-library.asp?id=17. Kincaid and Coffer filed suit
individually and on behalf of a proposed class of KSU students. Kincaid, 191 F.3d at
724. The suit named as defendants Betty Gibson, Mary Smith, and the eleven mem-
bers of KSU's Board of Regents. Id.
A separate lawsuit already had resulted from the University's control over the stu-
dent publications. In March 1995, Cullen filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky against KSU and KSU officials, claiming that the
University violated the students' First Amendment rights and transferred her from her
position as Coordinator of Student Publications in retaliation. See Cullen v. Gibson,
No. 96-6116, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33186, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 1997) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision) (stating the procedural history of the case, including the
unreported actions of the court below). Cullen sought damages and a court order re-
quiring the University to distribute the confiscated yearbooks and to refrain from con-
trolling the student publications. Id. at *5-6. After the court ruled against Cullen,
holding in part that she lacked standing because the alleged First Amendment viola-
tions injured the students and not her, she appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. at *3. Affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit held
that Cullen's case was moot because she had resigned from KSU after filing the lawsuit.
Id. at *7-8. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied Cullen's petition
for certiorari. 522 U.S. 1117 (1998).
128 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 724. The students further claimed that the yearbook con-
fiscation deprived students of their property rights in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the confiscation breached a contractual duty to provide students with a
yearbook in return for the eighty-dollar mandatory student activity fee, and the Uni-
versity's actions constituted an arbitrary exercise of governmental power in violation of
the Kentucky Constitution. Id.
129 Id. Kincaid and Coffer also sought class certification for all former and present
KSU students who were either consumers of or contributors to The Thorobred and The
Thorobred News. Id. at 724-25. The district court denied the request. Id. at 725.
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count. An appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals followed,
and, on September 8, 1999, the Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, af-
firmed the district court on each count.13 However, on November 29,
1999, the full Sixth Circuit voted for rehearing of the case en banc
and vacated its September 8th decision . The full court reversed the
133 dteUiest n
district court decision on January 5, 2001 , and the University and
the students ultimately reached a settlement on the matter in Febru-
ary 2001 .
D. Kincaid v. Gibson: District Court Opinion
The district court, in its November 14, 1997, ruling, considered
the students' First Amendment free speech claims as to the yearbook
and newspaper, the breach of contract claim, and the arbitrary and
capricious governmental action claim.
35 The portion of the court's
opinion relying on Hazelwood centered on the students' First Amend-
ment free speech claim as to the yearbook. The court began its analy-
sis by stating, "[t] he First Amendment certifies that the state shall not
abridge a citizen's right to free speech. The Supreme Court, however,
has allowed speech to be regulated in some circumstances."
136 The ex-
tent to which speech may be regulated, the court noted, depends on
the nature of the forum of the speech:
If the forum is either a public forum or a limited public forum, then the
state can only regulate the content of the speech when it puts forth a
narrow and compelling reason to do so. If the forum is not a public fo-
rum, however, the state need only show that the "regulation on speech is
"137
reasonable ....
130 Id. By memorandum opinion entered on June 26, 1996, the district court, cit-
ing Eleventh Amendment immunity, already had dismissed each of the students'
claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities. Id.
The court also had dismissed the students' Fourteenth Amendment due process claim,
stating that neither the students' expectations of receiving a yearbook nor their alleged
contract for goods rose to the level of a vested property right. Id. Finally, the court
dismissed the students' First Amendment free association claim. Id.
1"1 Id. at 730.
132 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999).
133 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
134 Student Press Law Center, News Flash: KSU Agrees to Release Yearbooks Confiscated
by School Officials in 1994 in Settlement with Students, at
http://www.splc.org/newsflash-archives.asp?id=238&year-2001 (Mar. 1, 2001).
135 Kincaid, No. 95-98 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1997), http://www.splc.org/
lawlibrary.asp?id=l 7.
136 Id.
137 Id. (citing and quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
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The central determination was thus whether the yearbook was a
public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic forum, a deter-
mination the court conceded was "not clear."
38
The court noted that the few courts that have considered whether
a yearbook is a public forum have not universally agreed. For the
proposition that any university publication is a public forum, the court
acknowledged the reasoning set forth in Bazaar v. Fortune.139 The Fifth
Circuit in Bazaar recognized the principle accepted by many courts
that a university publication should be considered an "open forum"
and as such can only be censored when the publication "would or
could lead to any significant disruption on the University campus. 1
4
0
Using this reasoning, the Bazaar court held that a university's censor-1 141
ship of a student literary magazine violated the First Amendment.
To contrast with the Bazaar line of cases, the district court in Kin-
caid addressed Hazelwood and its progeny. The court noted that the
Supreme Court in Hazelwood stated that the crucial element in deter-
mining whether a school publication is a public forum is the pub-
lisher's intent to open that forum to the public. 42 Because the Hazel
wood court found that the school had not intended to open its student
newspaper to the public, the newspaper was not deemed a public fo-
143 144rum. Following that reasoning, the district court noted, the First
Circuit in Yeo v. Town of Lexington held that advertising pages in a high
school student newspaper and yearbook were a limited public forum
because advertising space could be purchased by outside users. 4 The
dissent in Yeo, however, reached the opposite conclusion, stating that
neither the yearbook advertising section nor the yearbook as a whole
could be considered a public forum.146 In addition, the dissent rea-
U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)).
138 Id.
139 476 F.2d 570, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1973) (ordering a public university on First
Amendment free speech grounds to refrain from interfering with the publication and
distribution of a student magazine).
140 Id. at 575-76.
141 Id. at 580.




145 No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173 (1st Cir. June 6, 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion), opinion withdrawn and reh 'g granted, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). The
court in Yeo limited its public forum analysis to the advertising pages in the publica-
tions, not to the publications in their entirety. Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *23.
46 Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *27 (Lynch,J., dissenting).
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soned that the newspaper also could not be deemed a public forum:
"High school yearbooks are not usually vehicles for the expression of
views, or for robust debate about societal issues, and they never have
been. 147
Finally, the district court in Kincaid148 cited the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School District.49 In Planned
Parenthood, the court held that the advertising pages of a public school
yearbook, newspaper, and athletic programs were not public forums
and thus could be regulated by the school.50 The court stated:
Under Hazelwood, in cases such as this where school facilities have not in-
tentionally been opened to indiscriminate expressive use by the public
or some segment of the public, school officials retain the authority rea-
sonably to refuse to lend the schools' name and resources to speech dis-
seminated under school auspices.
Faced with this conflicting legal authority, the district court in
Kincaid found the analysis set forth in Planned Parenthood and in the
Yeo dissent more persuasive, particularly when considered in light of
Hazelwood152 The court thus found that KSU did not intend to open
The Thorobred to the public and as a result could exercise reasonable
control over the yearbook.5 3 Without acknowledging any potential
differences between a student publication at the high school and col-
lege levels, the court stated, "the yearbook was not intended to be a
journal of expression and communication in a public forum sense,
but instead was intended to be a journal of the 'goings on' . . . at
KSU."15 4 As a result, the court held that the University's refusal to dis-
tribute the yearbooks was reasonable. The court noted:
It was reasonable for the administration to want the annual to explain
who the students were in the pictures-so that fifteen years from now,
the students could look back and remember, for example, who the KSU
147 Id. at *27-29 (Lynch,J., dissenting).
148 No. 95-98 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 1997), http://www.splc.org/
lawlibrary.asp?id=1 7.
149 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
150 Id. at 830.
151 Id. at 828.





1940 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1915
homecoming queen was. Moreover, it was reasonable for the admini-
stration to want the yearbook to focus mainly on KSU. ss
Such factors, the court thus concluded, sufficed to warrant the Uni-
versity's control over The Thorobred.
56
E. Kincaid v. Gibson: Vacated Sixth Circuit Opinion
Affirming the district court in a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit
panel, like the district court, began its analysis by addressing the con-
flict in the federal courts over whether the content of school publica-tion is ubje t . • 157
ions is subject to regulation. The panel noted, for example, that
the federal courts widely held in the 1970s and early 1980s that the
First Amendment protected college publications.158  However, the
155 Id. Despite ruling against the students, the court concluded its opinion by stat-
ing: "In the end, the parties have caused a lot of strife over a yearbook, and have not
only hurt themselves, but have, more importantly, hurt the student body and KSU, by
not allowing a yearbook to be published for the 1992-1994 years." Id.
156 Id. The court ruled against the students on their remaining claims as well.
Addressing the students' First Amendment claim as to the newspaper, the court held
that the students lacked standing to bring suit because they suffered no injury. Id.
The students' contentions that they were harmed by Gibson's criticisms of certain
comic strips, that the comic strips were not published as a result of the criticism, and
that Cullen was transferred to a new position for refusing to follow Gibson's orders did
not rise to the level of injury required for standing. Id. Addressing the students'
breach of contract claim, the court held that damages cannot be had against KSU or
the individual defendants in their official capacities because they are entitled to sover-
eign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Furthermore, the defendants
could not be held individually liable because they did not individually contract with
the students. Id. Finally, addressing the students' arbitrary and capricious governmen-
tal action claim, the court held that since the University had the right to exercise rea-
sonable control over The Thorobred, its action could not be considered arbitrary and
capricious. Id.
Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 726 (6th Cir. 1999).
158 Id. For the proposition that the First Amendment protects college publica-
tions, the court cited Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983), holding that a
university violated students' First Amendment rights when it cut the student newspa-
per's funding, in part, because it objected to the newspaper's content; Schiffv. Williams,
519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975), finding that a university encroached on students' free
speech rights when it dismissed student newspaper editors because of disapproval of
the newspaper's content; Jyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973), ruling that a
university's withdrawal of funding from a student newspaper violated First Amendment
rights; Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973), finding a violation of students'
free speech rights when a university censored a student literary publication; Korn v.
Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1970), holding that a university's removal of offensive
content from a student publication violated students' First Amendment rights; and An-
tonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970), finding a free speech infringe-
ment when a university required prior review of all content in a student newspaper.
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court then turned its attention to Hazelwood, stating, "The framework
established in Hazelwood applies to plaintiffs' claims in the instant ac-
tion."59 Despite acknowledging several factors that distinguished Ha-
zelwood, the court found the Hazelwood analysis governing and held
that Kincaid and Coffer provided insufficient evidence to prove that
KSU intended The Thorobred to serve as a public forum.16° For exam-
ple, although the University's student handbook provided that "it is
the intent that both [ The Thorobred and The Thorobred News] shall be as
free of censorship as prevailing law dictates," the court found that the
"language certainly contains nothing to suggest an intent by the uni-
versity to expand the protection afforded student speech in a nonpub-
lic forum to that of a public forum."' 61
Moreover, the panel found other evidence expressly indicating
that the University did not intend to open The Thorobred to the public.
For example, the University's student handbook emphasized that both
The Thorobred and The Thorobred News "shall be under the management
of the Student Publications Board" and that the Board had the
authority to carry out specific responsibilities, such as approval of the
publications' written policies.'62 Thus, the court stated, "although the
university evinced an intention that students be allowed to determine
the content of expression, it left ultimate control over the form and
manner of that expression in the hands of the Publications Board.',
63
159 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 726. The court rejected the students' claim that Hazel-
wood did not apply because the yearbook was under the control of private individuals,
that is, the students. Id. at 726 n.2.
160 Id. at 727-28. Among the distinctions the court cited were the fact that The
Thorobred was not produced as part of a classroom activity, unlike the newspaper in Ha-
zelwood, and the fact that KSU officials did not regularly intervene in the day-to-day op-
erations of the yearbook, unlike the involvement of school officials in Hazelwood. Id. at
727. The court, however, ignored the distinction that The Thorobred was a college pub-
lication and the newspaper in Hazelwood was a high school publication.
161 Id. at 728. The court also found unconvincing the fact that the University had
not yet adopted an official policy regarding the scope of The Thorobred's intended pur-
pose. Id.
Id.
163 Id. The panel also contrasted the University's statement in its student hand-
book that it did not consider The Thorobred News to be "an 'official' organ of the Uni-
versity" with the absence of any such statement for the yearbook. Id. Noting that the
University only required The Thorobred News to include a disclaimer "indicating that the
views expressed are not necessarily those of the University, but rather are those of the
named student author, editor or board of editors," the court stated that "[t]he exclu-
sion of the yearbook from this requirement evidences KSU's intent that the yearbook
bear the imprimatur of KSU and serve, as defendant Gibson testified, as a KSU-
sponsored representation of student life at the university rather than as an open forum
for student expression." Id.
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Given such factors, the court concluded that "KSU intended The
Thorobred to remain a nonpublic forum."
164
Having so concluded, the court proceeded to consider whether
the University's confiscation of the yearbooks was reasonable. In a
brief analysis of the record, the court found the University's action
justifiable. The court emphasized:
It is no doubt reasonable that KSU should seek to maintain its image
to potential students, alumni, and the general public. In light of the
undisputedly poor quality of the yearbook, it is also reasonable that KSU
might cut its losses by refusing to distribute a university publication that
might tarnish, rather than enhance, that image. 165
The court also acknowledged Kincaid and Coffer's claim that it may
have been more reasonable for the Student Publications Board to
have monitored the yearbook before its completion.166 But, the court
stated, "regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum 'need only be rea-
sonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation. "1
67
In a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Judge Cole argued that the court should have reached the opposite
conclusion regarding The Thorobred.'8 Asserting that the yearbook
should have been considered a public forum, Judge Cole criticized
the majority for relying on Hazelwood, when that case addressed a high
school publication.'69 Judge Cole stated:
The majority fails to acknowledge this point, instead applying the same
level of deference to KSU as the Court did to Hazelwood East High
School. Neither this court nor any of our sister circuits have taken a po-
sition on this issue, and I hesitate to do so implicitly, as the majority has
done. '7
Even applying Hazelwood, Judge Cole would have found the yearbook
164 Id.
165 Id. at 729.
11,Id.
167 M
167 Id. (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683
(1992)). The court ruled against Kincaid and Coffer on their other claims as well. Id.
at 729-30. On the students' First Amendment claim as to The Thorobred News, the court
affirmed the district court's finding that the students lacked standing. Id. The court
also affirmed the district court's findings against the students on their breach of con-
tract claims and on their arbitrary and capricious governmental action claim. Id. at
730.
168 Id. (ColeJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 Id. (Cole,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170 Id. (Cole,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to be a limited public forum, not a nonpublic forum.
17'
In so finding, Judge Cole referred to a portion of the student
handbook allowing the student publications advisor to require
changes in materials in the publications, but those changes "must deal
only with the form or the time and manner of expression rather than
alteration of its content."172  Such language, Judge Cole reasoned,
equated with language in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass 'n173 defining the First Amendment protection afforded a limited
public forum: "'a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn
to effectuate a compelling state interest."1 74 Treating The Thorobred as
a limited public forum, Judge Cole found that KSU's actions were un-
constitutional content-based restrictions that did not serve a compel-
ling governmental interest.
F. Kincaid v. Gibson: Sixth Circuit En Banc Decision
By a 10-3 vote, the full Sixth Circuit reversed the panel decision
that extended the Hazelwood standard to college publications.176 The
court concluded instead that The Thorobred was a limited public forum,
thus rejecting KSU's contention that The Thorobred was a nonpublic fo-
rum.1 The court relied on several factors in concluding that The
Thorobred was a limited public forum, that is, that KSU intended to
open the yearbook to the public. These factors included KSU's policy
and practice, the nature of The Thorobred and its compatibility with ex-
pressive activity, and the context in which the yearbook was
founded. 17 Applying these factors, the court found "clear evidence of
KSU's intent to make the yearbook a limited public 
forum."179
Addressing KSU's policy, as written in the "Student Publications"
section of the KSU student handbook, the court noted foremost that
171 Id. at 731 (Cole,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172 Id. (Cole,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'73 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
174 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 731 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
175 Id. (Cole,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("Be-
cause we find that a forum analysis requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited
public forum-rather than a nonpublic forum-we agree with the parties that Hazel-
wood has little application to this case.").
177 Id. at 348-49. For more detailed discussions of the public forum doctrine, see
supra note 49 and infta Part III.C.
178 Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 352.
179 Id. at 349.
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the policy put editorial control of the yearbook in the hands of stu-
dent editors."'s The court stated of this policy:
This is made clear by the policy's description of the Student Publications
Advisor, a university employee. The policy directs that the [Board]
"shall require the use of an experienced advisor," but limits the advisor's
role to "assuring that the.., yearbook is not overwhelmed by ineptitude
and inexperience." Indeed, the policy expressly limits the types of
changes that the advisor may make to the yearbook ......
Turning to the possibility of KSU potentially intending to create a
limited public forum, the court found "substantial evidence" that the
University "followed its stated 'hands off policy in actual practice."82
For example, prior to publication, the administration never expressed
concern about the yearbook's content, nor did any official exercise
oversight of the content."' As a result, the court stated: "[T]he rec-
ord before us is clear that, in actual practice, student editors-not
KSU officials, not the student publications advisor, and not the
[Board] -- determined the content of KSU's student yearbook."
184
The nature of The Thorobred and its compatibility with expressive
activity, and the context in which the yearbook was found, also con-
vinced the court that the yearbook was a limited public forum.1'8 The
court emphasized, for example, that the yearbook, "by its very nature,
exists for the purpose of expressive activity. """ The court also distin-
guished the yearbook from the newspaper at issue in Hazelwood, not-
ing that The Thorobred was not a classroom activity for which students
received grades."" Indeed, the court stated that the context in which
the case arose, a university setting, gave greater support to the finding
of a limited public forum.8 8 Citing several Supreme Court cases that
highlighted the importance of open and robust speech on college
campuses, the court stated: "The university environment is the quin-
tessential 'marketplace of ideas,' which merits full, or indeed height-
ened, First Amendment protection."'8 " The court also once again dis-
180 Id.
181 Id. at 349-50.
182 Id. at 351.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 351-52.
1s6 Id. at 351.
187 Id. at 352.
188 Id.
189 Id.
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tinguished Hazelwood:
In addition to the nature of the university setting, we find it relevant that
the editors of The Thorobred and its readers are likely to be young
adults-Kincaid himself was thirty-seven at the time of his March 1997
deposition. Thus, there can be no justification for suppressing the year-
book on the grounds that it might be "unsuitable for immature audi-
ences.
" 190
The court thus concluded that the yearbook was a limited public
forum and turned its attention to determining whether KSU's con-
duct was constitutional in light of that conclusion.
As previously discussed, in a limited public forum, the government
may only impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and
content-based restrictions that are narrowly drawn to serve a compel-
ling state interest. '9' The court found that KSU's conduct violated this
principle.' 92 Concluding that the University's action was far from nar-
rowly drawn, the court stated that "wholesale confiscation of printed
materials which the state feels reflect poorly on its institutions is as
broadly sweeping a regulation as the state might muster.' 93 The court
also noted that the confiscation left open no alternative means of simi-
lar communication.'94 Moreover, the court emphasized that the Uni-
versity's actions would have failed to pass constitutional muster even
under the more lenient nonpublic forum standard:
Even were we to assume, as the KSU officials argue, that the yearbook
was a nonpublic forum, confiscation of the yearbook would still violate
Kincaid's and Coffer's free speech rights. Although the government may
act to preserve a nonpublic forum for its intended purposes, its regula-
tion of speech must nonetheless be reasonable, and it must not attempt
to suppress expression based on the speaker's viewpoint. The actions
taken by the KSU officials fail under even this relaxed standard.'
9
The court thus concluded that the First Amendment rights of Kincaid
and Coffer were violated and remanded the case for determination of
the proper relief.
196
Following the court's ruling, the University reached a settlement
190 Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).





195 Id. at 355 (citations omitted).
196 Id. at 357.
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with Kincaid and Coffer.'97 In exchange for the students' agreement
to settle the case before a court determination of relief, the University
provided $5,000 each to Kincaid and Coffer, plus $60,000 in attorney's
fees and costs. In addition, the University agreed to release the con-
fiscated yearbooks 9s
G. Reaction to KSU's Actions, the Court Rulings, and
Censorship on College Campuses
Reaction to the actions of the KSU administration and to the fed-
eral courts' decisions in Kincaid has been extensive. Not surprisingly,
given the effect the ruling could have on college media, newspapers
on campuses nationwide have written extensively on the topic. Fol-
lowing the district court's decision, the University of Kentucky's stu-
dent newspaper, the Kentucky Kernel, quoted Carlos Dawson, then the
editor of Kentucky's yearbook: "It is a shame this has happened be-
cause part ofjournalism is creativity. " 19' Libby Fraas, ajournalism pro-
fessor at Eastern Kentucky University and faculty advisor to its student
newspaper, had harsher criticism: "How they can call themselves an
'educational institution' is beyond me if they exercise such disdain for
the First Amendment rights of their students."20 0 Reaction to the dis-
trict court's ruling was picked up in the popular press as well. The
Lexington Herald-Leader, for example, quoted individuals on both sides
of the dispute, contrasting a college journalism advisor's fear over ex-
cessive administrative censorship with the concern of universities that
campus publications meet certain standards. °'
Following the Sixth Circuit's since-vacated September 8, 1999, de-
cision, the reaction continued. Once again, both college publications
and the popular media reported on the decision.2  Media coverage of
197 See Student Press Law Center, supra note 134.
198 See id. (noting that "the University agreed to distribute the 717 remaining cop-
ies of the 1994 Thorobred yearbook... to the students who were supposed to receive
them in 1994").
199 Molly Mize & Mat Herron, Ruling Worries Student Media, KENTUCKY KERNEL,
Dec. 4, 1997, available athttp://www.kernel.uky.edu/1997/fall/12/O4/news4.shtml.
200 Id.
201 SeeJohn Cheves, Kentucky State Students Demand Belated Release of Confiscated Year-
book, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 2, 1998 (reporting on the KSU legal dispute
and on the opinions of individuals on both sides of the dispute); see also Jeffrey
Selingo, Federal Court Ruling Worries Student Journalists, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 12,
1997, at A40 (discussing the district court's ruling and both the university's and stu-
dents' reactions to it).
202 See, e.g., College Publications Should Remain Free, CRIMSON WHITE, republished via
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the dispute continues to this day. The Society of Professional Journal-
ists, for example, reported in its publication, The Quill that it had
given a $4000 grant to the lawyers representing Kincaid and Coffer21
"This case could potentially cast a long shadow," the society's presi-
dent, Kyle Elyse Niederpruem, told The Quill. "This takes standards
set for high school journalists, allowing broad and unrestricted
authority for administrators to censor materials. 2 °4
Causing further concern for free speech advocates is the increase
in censorship on college campuses in recent years. Indeed,
"[c] ensorship of public university student newspapers is alive and well
in the United States."20 1 Interestingly, universities far less frequently
censor the liberal student ideas that were so often censored in earlier
decades. Instead, "the trend today is one of wary liberal administra-
tions attempting to censor conservative viewpoints," 20 6 such as racist or
racially sensitive material.
Censorship on campus currently takes shape in at least two other
prominent ways. First, universities attempt to regulate speech that is
critical of some aspect of the university. Second, universities increas-
ingly seek to control the choice of advertisements in student publica-
207tions. In order to achieve these goals, universities rely on a variety of
actions, the most prevalent of which are prior restraint by a university
censorship board, personal attacks against a student editor, and at-
208
tacks against the funding of a publication. Universities also give sev-
eral justifications for censorship, especially of student publications.
Such reasons include preventing disruption of the campus, protecting
students from offensive speech, and ensuring that student expression
U-WiRE, Sept. 9, 1999 (criticizing the Sixth Circuit decision as "dangerous to student
publications at public universities across the country"), available at LEXIS; Ben L.
Kaufman, KSU Yearbook Seizure Upheld: Free-Speech Arguments Rejected, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Sept. 9, 1999, at Bi (reporting on the majority opinion, the dissent, and
reaction to the Sixth Circuit's ruling); Rachel Malone, Federal Courts Didn't Serve Justice
to Student Journalists, DAILY MISSISSIPPIAN, republished via U-WIRE, Sept. 9, 1999 ("In an
environment where students are trying to become professionals, there is nothing pro-
fessional about censorship. Our job as journalists is to be watchdogs of society, not
smiling faces or talking heads for university officials."), available at LEXIS.
SPJAwards $4,000 to Help with Students' Case, THE QUILL, July 2000, at 75.
204 Id.
205 Greg C. Tenhoff, Note, Censoring the Public University Student Press: A Constitu-
tional Challenge, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 511,511 (1991).
206 Id. at 512.
207 See id. (describing the movement toward banning alcohol advertisements in
student publications).
208 See id. at 515-17 (discussing methods used by universities to restrain student
journalists).
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is not attributed to the university.' °9 In response to such acts of cen-
sorship and other college media concerns, the Student Press Law Cen-
ter in 1999 received 748 inquiries regarding college censorship, down
slightly from 791 in 1998.210
III. INAPPLICABILITY OF HAZEL WOOD TO COLLEGE CAMPUSES
With the historical backdrop of First Amendment jurisprudence
in mind, the Hazelwood free-speech standard, as a matter of law and
policy, should not be applied to student speech on college campuses.
The Court held in Hazelwood that "educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns.... For several reasons, such a standard is inappropriate when
applied to speech at the college level.
A. Differing Judicial Treatment of Primary and Secondary Education
as Opposed to College Education
Applying Hazelwood to student expression on college campuses
would fly in the face of the Supreme Court's long recognized prece-
dent that diverse expression is vital to higher education. Indeed, the
distinction between the Court's recognition of college free expression
and primary and secondary school free expression could not be more
stark.
1. Role of Free Expression in College Education
Unlike primary and secondary schools, the Court has long held,
college campuses are unquestionably a "marketplace of ideas."2 2 Ex-
posure to many viewpoints indeed historically has been a defining
characteristic of higher education. With this mindset, the Supreme
Court has held, for example, that a university cannot fire employees
209 See id. at 528-38 (highlighting the many rationales offered by universities to jus-
tify censorship of student publications).
210 1999 Censorship, supra note 84.
21 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
212 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see
also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (emphasizing that
an atmosphere of "'speculation, experiment and creation"' is "essential to the quality
of higher education" (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
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pursuant to a state law for belonging to the Communist Party.21 To
do so, the Court has stated, would contravene the notion that the
"[n]ation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide expo-
sure to that robust exchange of ideas."2
The Court focused on similar principles in Healy v. James. 5 In rul-
ing that a college could not prohibit the formation of a student or-
ganization because it opposed the organization's viewpoint, the Court
emphasized that the First Amendment applies equally to college cam-
puses as it does to the society as a whole:
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community
at large. Quite to the contrary, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of Ameri-
can schools." The college classroom with its surrounding environs is pe-
culiarly the "marketplace of ideas," and we break no new constitutional
ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic
freedom.
2 16
The Court has adhered to this view throughout its consideration
of cases touching on the value of diverse expression on college cam-
puses. Indeed, two of the most significant recent Supreme Court de-
cisions addressing issues on college campuses have relied in part on
the role free speech plays in higher education. In Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court took a historical ap-
proach to First Amendment jurisprudence on college campuses in
holding that a university could not refuse to fund the printing of a re-
ligious newspaper produced by students.217 The Court emphasized
that universities began in ancient Athens and later in Europe as "vol-
untary and spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to
speak and to write and to learn."2 8 Noting that the intellectual curios-
ity of students remains today a central determination of a university's
success, the Court asserted that restriction of that curiosity "risks the
213 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 609-10.
214 Id. at 603.
215 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
216 Id. at 180-81 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960), and Keyi-
shian, 385 U.S. at 603); see also Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S.
667, 671 (1973) ("[T]he First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual
standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech .....
217 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995).
218 Id. at 836 (citing R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
WORLD 39 (7th ed. 1992)).
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suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital cen-
ters for the Nation's intellectual life, its college and university cam-
puses."'
Such a concern was also at play in the Supreme Court's most re-
cent consideration of First Amendment rights on college campuses.
In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth 
the Court considered the constitutionality of the university's manda-
tory student activity fee that was used to fund various student groups.
In upholding the fee system against a First Amendment challenge
from students who opposed the funding of organizations whose view-
points they opposed, the Court briefly stated that "recognition must
be given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the Uni-
versity, which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech. 2 In recog-
nizing that principle, the Court agreed with the argument put forth by
the University of Wisconsin that an essential function of its educa-
tional mission is exposure to a diversity of expressions and ideas.22
Thus, to this day, the Supreme Court has recognized the value of free
speech on college campuses, a value that was perhaps first and most
forcefully put forth in the 1957 case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universi-
ties is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in
a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To
impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation .... Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.
2. Role of Free Expression in Primary and Secondary Education
While the "essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities" may have a long history, similar freedom in primary and
secondary schools has been in much dispute since the nation's found-
ing. Given the historical dispute, both modem scholars and federal
courts have struggled over what role free speech should play in educa-
219 Id.
220 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
221 Id. at 231.
222 See Brief for Petitioners at 21, Southworth (No. 98-1189) ("The Board of Regents
has also determined that it is essential to provide certain services to a diverse student
population, which at times also involve the expression of diverse viewpoints.").
223 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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tion. However, in recent decades, the vast majority of courts have
recognized only a limited role for free speech in primary and secon-
dary schools, in sharp contrast to the broader free speech rights
granted to college students.
In the early days of the nation, Americans held two competing vi-
sions of social order, visions that have ever since impacted the educa-
tional missions of the nation's primary and secondary schools.
2 4 Un-
der one vision, embraced by the federalists in the nation's early years
and derived from liberal Enlightenment thought, emphasis was placed
on individualism. According to this vision, "the purpose of the com-
munity was simply to give individuals the needed security (i.e., free-
dom) to pursue their private interests. 2 2'  The alternative vision
minimized the emphasis on individuality and instead focused on the
social nature and interaction of individuals. This vision of "civic re-
publicanism," dating back to ancient Greece and the Italian city-states,
was based on the assumption "that people were shaped by the institu-
tions in which they functioned" and that it was "the responsibility of
these institutions to promote 'civic virtue.' '2 6 The tension between
this vision of civic republicanism and the vision of individualism per-
meated all facets of the nation's early life and in many ways continues
to do so today. Perhaps no clearer example of this tension exists than
in the public school classroom:
The dilemma of public education is thus manifest. Because few insti-
tutions affect young, impressionable personalities as profoundly as do
our schools, we as a community are justifiably concerned that our educa-
tional program should promote the "right" skills and values for the de-
velopment of an individual capable of contributing in a meaningful way
to our community. Yet by authorizing schools to develop this "right" en-
vironment, we leave our children highly vulnerable to "village tyrants"
who might pervert the education process. Under the guise of properly
educating the young, government could predispose children to accept
and defer to authority while passively adopting prevailing values and cur-
rent attitudes. The school system, consequently, epitomizes the tension
between liberty and authority."'
Thus, on the one hand, primary and secondary schools may be
viewed as institutions responsible for instilling values in the nation's
young children, children who need the shaping and guidance pro-
224 Ingber, supra note 20, at 430.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 431.
227 Id. at 425 (footnotes omitted).
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vided by those with greater experience. This perception considers
schools, and the educational lessons those schools choose to provide,
as the primary means by which students are prepared to be the na-
tion's future leaders. On the other hand, schools may be viewed as in-
stitutions that allow for the individual expression and creativity of stu-
dents. Under this perception, students learn not only by what schools
choose to teach them, but also by experimenting, exploring, and
freely expressing thoughts.
This tension has confounded both modern scholars and federal
courts. While some scholars argue for primary and secondary school
students to have greater liberty, others take the distinctly opposing
view. Professor Stanley Ingber, for example, has asserted that while
both visions play important roles in education, the vision of schools as
tolerating open expression must not be ignored. Ingber has stated:
Given our constitutional mandate, our educational goals should not
be limited to imparting to children useful information and transmitting
to them the cultural norms of the past .... Authority and obedience
may aid the efficient pursuit of some of our goals, but if free speech is
neglected in the day-to-day contexts so central to the character-forging
experiences of our impressionable youth, we risk breeding caution and
stifling initiative, thereby fostering only the virtue of obedience.
228
Ingber, however, does not have a monopoly on the scholarly de-
bate over the role of free expression in primary and secondary
schools. Indeed, Beverly L. Hall, the former deputy schools chancel-
lor of the New York City school system, has argued that a school set-
ting that is overly tolerant of student speech hinders students' educa-
tional development. According to Hall, "most students in our public
schools appreciate boundaries and are themselves not happy or pro-
ductive in an atmosphere where they feel that 'anything goes.' 229 In
228 Id. at 455. Professor Richard L. Roe, among others, has also argued that stu-
dent speech in secondary schools deserves greater First Amendment protection, given
the vital educational value of diverse expression. See Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student
Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1276
(1991) ("[A]n understanding of the work of the schools as conceptual development
necessitates a high degree of tolerance for student speech under the protection of the
first amendment."); see also Lush, supra note 16, at 126 (arguing that public school stu-
dents' fights should be expanded because students are confined within the school set-
ting and thus their rights deserve the greatest protection).
M Hall, supra note 20, at 516; see also Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have
Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 49, 104
(1996) ("Public schools-if they are to continue as an institution-simply must be al-
lowed to keep order."); Hafen & Hafen, supra note 20, at 413 ("[T]he decline in U.S.
student academic achievement during the 1970's and 1980's is clearly linked to the
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her experience as a school administrator in various schools and school
districts, Hall continued, "in schools where student achievement is
good, established parameters exist that govern student conduct,"
whereas "when you visit low-performing schools and question the
children or their parents, you will receive an overwhelming response
that the reason the school is in such poor condition is that no one is
enforcing a code or standard of behavior."230
Federal courts today, especially the Supreme Court, have en-
dorsed firmly the reasoning of Hall and others who argue for limited
free speech rights in primary and secondary schools. The Court's
modern conception of limited free speech rights in those schools is in
sharp contrast to the free speech rights that currently exist on college
campuses. While the Court did not always hold such a restrictive view
of First Amendment protection for public school students, as illus-
trated by its opinion in Tinker, the matter is well settled today. Indeed,
Tinker's conception of public school education is largely ignored by
the current Court. In Tinker, upholding students' right to wear sym-
bolic black armbands in school, the Court stated that the Constitution
requires schools to allow free expression even at the risk of argument
or disturbance.23 The Court stated, "our history says that it is this sort
of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
society.""'
Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, have chiseled away at
the notion invoked in Tinker that freedom of expression enhances the
educational mission of the nation's primary and 
secondary schools.
2 2
The Court in Fraser approvingly cited an academic text and a prior
Supreme Court case endorsing the "civic republicanism" notion of
decline in school authority that followed in the wake of Tinker and the anti-
authoritarian era it symbolized."); Hymowitz, supra note 20, at 554 ("What is often for-
gotten in the contemporary scholarly literature on childhood is that a society must
shape the childhood it needs.").
Hall, supra note 20, at 515-17.
231 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
232 Id. at 508-09.
233 The current conception of secondary schools' educational mission actually
harkens back to a pre-Tinker case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
In Brown, while not addressing students' free speech rights, the Court emphasized the
vital role secondary schools play in shaping the minds of students. The Court de-
scribed secondary schools as "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment." Id.
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public education. 23 4 Specifically, the Court quoted The Beards'New Ba-
sic History of the United States: "' [P] ublic education must prepare pupils
for citizenship in the Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and
as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community
and the nation.'
235
The Court in Fraser also referred to its earlier decision in Ambach
2363v. Norwick, where it described the objective of public education as
the "[inculcation of] fundamental values necessary to the mainte-
nance of a democratic political system."23 7 Thus, while acknowledging
that students do have certain rights, according to the Court in Fraser,
those rights can be restricted when they interfere with a school's re-
sponsibility to teach students "the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior" and "the shared values of a civilized social order."2 38 The
Court not only reaffirmed that principle in Hazelwood, but also firmly
established it as a defining characteristic of modern public school
education, a characteristic that has been relied on repeatedly in the
lower federal courts.239 Indeed, the Court in Hazelwood stated that if
schools could not regulate certain student speech, "the schools would
be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role" as the primary in-
2401strument in shaping the nation's children.
Given this conception, therefore, it bears repeating briefly that
the federal courts view the role of free expression on college cam-
234 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
235 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE
BEARDS' NEW BASIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (William Beard ed., rev. ed.
1968) (1944)).
236 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
237 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77). The Court in Fraser
also stated that the "inculcation of these values is truly the 'work of the schools.'" Id. at
683 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
23 Id. at 681-83.
239 See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 20, at 396 ("[Llower courts.., have read Ha-
zelwood broadly. These courts accept the Supreme Court's recognition that school
officials must have broad discretion to pursue their primary educational mission of
preparing children for adulthood and full integration into society." (citations omit-
ted)).
240 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988). The Court
adopted this principle yet again only seven years ago, in Vernonia School District v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995). In Acton, the Court upheld the right of a school district to admin-
ister random drug tests to student athletes, stating that "Fourth Amendment rights, no
less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than
elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and
tutelary responsibility for children." Id. at 656.
TRAMPLING THE "MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS"
puses in stark contrast to its role in primary and secondary schools.
Whereas colleges historically have taken it upon themselves to culti-
vate creativity, experimentation, and a "marketplace of ideas," such
free expression rights are less recognized in primary and secondary
schools. Indeed, as the Court now firmly recognizes, those schools are
primarily responsible not for encouraging exposure to a vast array of
viewpoints, but rather for instilling in students particular values and
principles that will prepare them for future endeavors. As a result,
any attempt to extend the Hazelwood standard to college campuses
seemingly would require an abandonment of this long-recognized dis-
tinction.
B. College Students as Fundamentally Different from
Primary and Secondary School Students
In addition to the differences between the roles of free speech on
college campuses and in primary and secondary schools, significant
differences exist between the students of both those institutions. As a
result of the inherent differences between younger students and col-
lege students, the rationales underlying Hazelwoods application in the
primary and secondary school setting are largely illogical in the con-
text of college campuses. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged
these distinctions, most explicitly in Widmar v. Vincent, when it stated,
"University students are, of course, young adults. They are less im-
pressionable than younger students... .,,141 Ten years earlier, the
Court used similar language in a case upholding a federal law that
provided funding to church-related colleges and universities for the
construction of facilities to be used exclusively for secular educational
purposes. In upholding the law, the Court noted that while pre-
college students may not have the maturity to make their own deci-
sions on religion, "[t]here is substance to the contention that college
students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious in-
,,142
doctrination.
In both Fraser and Hazelwood, furthermore, the Court, in restrict-
ing students' First Amendment rights, put significant weight on the
241 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981). Among lower federal courts, the Ninth Circuit,
in upholding a high school's decision to prohibit the inclusion in school publications
of an advertisement publicizing the services of Planned Parenthood, has recognized
that "educators must have the ability to consider the 'emotional maturity of the in-
tended audience.'" Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941
F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272).
242 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
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maturity of the students in the high schools. Indeed, in unusually
judgmental language, the Court in Fraser starkly displayed its belief
that primary and secondary school students lack maturity when it de-
scribed the student who gave the objectionable speech at the school
assembly as "this confused boy."2 43 Further addressing the perceived
lack of maturity of younger students, the Court stated:
The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly offensive to
both teachers and students-indeed to any mature person. By glorifying
male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting
to teenage girl students. The speech could well be seriously damaging to
its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on
the threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were re-
ported as bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it pro-
voked.244
Thus, a central concern of the Fraser Court was the young age and ac-
companying immaturity of the students exposed to the objectionable
speech.
The Court expressed that same concern two years later in Hazel-
wood. Indeed, the Court in Hazelwood asserted:
[A] school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of
the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student
speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the exis-
tence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of
245teenage sexual activity in a high school setting.
With this principle in mind, and considering the facts at issue, the Ha-
zelwood Court determined that "[i]t was not unreasonable for the
principal to have concluded that such frank talk was inappropriate in
a school-sponsored publication distributed to 14-year-old freshmen
and presumably taken home to be read by students' even younger
brothers and sisters."
246
Given that Hazelwood put such emphasis on the relative immaturity
of the students, Judge Cole, in a separate opinion in the Sixth Cir-
cuit's vacated Kincaid decision, argued that the majority failed to rec-
ognize the differences between high school and college students. He
emphasized that the students at issue in Hazelwood were high school
students while the students at issue in Kincaid were college students,
and that the Hazelwood Court itself acknowledged a potential differ-
243 478 U.S. at 683.
244 Id. at 683-84 (citation omitted).
245 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
246 Id. at 274-75.
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ence in treatment for college students. 27 Judge Cole stated:
I believe that there is reason for courts to afford colleges and universities
less deference than they do high schools. While it may be a stretch to
consider college-aged students full adults, a school's concern for the
.emotional maturity of the intended audience" is certainly less pressing
for college students than for high school students.248
Thus, Judge Cole recognized the fundamental differences be-
tween college and high school school students, a distinction that the
majority in Kincaid failed to acknowledge. According to Judge Cole,
because of that distinction it seemed illogical to apply Hazelwood to the
facts at issue in Kincaid.
249
Such a conclusion is supported by other factors as well, ranging
from matters of common acceptance to the legal rights afforded to
the nation's younger citizens. It is well known, for example, that most




lege students often live away from their parents and have greater fi-
nancial independence. Furthermore, such traditional features of pre-
college life, such as allowances and curfews, are typically no longer at
play once a student reaches college. Additionally, the mere fact that
students are not required to attend college, while primary and secon-
dary school attendance is compulsory, weighs against the notion that
college students are comparable to younger students for First
2511Amendment purposes.
In a similar vein, college students, due to their age, typically have
far more legal rights than do public school students. As Judge Cole
recognized in his separate opinion in Kincaid, "[m] ost students are at
least eighteen years old when they enter college, an age at which soci-
ety affords them some of the same rights as adults (i.e., the right to
vote)." 252 Along with the legal right to vote, which young adults re-
247 Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 730 (6th Cir. 1999) (Cole, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
248 Id. at 730 n.1 (ColeJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Ha-
zelwood, 484 U.S. at 272).
249 Id. at 730 (Cole,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250 See Tenhoff, supra note 205, at 535 ("In the university context, the focus is not
on children in the public schools who need to be sheltered from harms inherent in the
community at large .... At some point, society needs to send its young adults to face
the world, with all its unpleasantries and hazards.").
251 See id. ("[U]niversity students are not a captive audience as are high school stu-
dents. Students are not required to attend college, nor are they required to be on
camus during any period of time.").
52 Kincaid, 191 F.3d at 731 n.1 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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ceive at the age of eighteen, college students, because of their age and
presumably concomitant maturity, historically have been granted sev-
eral other legal rights that are unavailable to students who have yet to
reach college age. For example, all college students are typically le-
gally of age to drive, a right that is available to fewer public school
students. College students also have reached the age to see R-rated
movies (seventeen years old), and even the age to see X-rated movies
(eighteen years old), as well as to serve in the military (eighteen years
old). Moreover, by the time many college students have reached their
junior and senior years, they are often of age to consume alcohol, a
right that is usually not available to any public school student.
3
Kay S. Hymowitz highlights the perceived limited maturity of, and
legal rights available to, high school students in recent decades by
comparing those students with their counterparts in earlier times.
Hymowitz asserts:
[T] here have been many places and times where a fifteen-year-old would
be viewed as an adult. In the middle ages and in pre-modern tribes and
villages all over the world, fifteen-year-olds could be soldiers, dukes,
farmers, married, and parents. Only a century ago in this country it was
immigrant children, not their mothers, who were the families' second
wage earners. A study of working class families in Massachusetts in the
1870s found that children as young as ten were providing a quarter of
the family budget. Between 1880 and 1910, manufacturers were still re-
254porting about one-quarter of their workforce was under sixteen.
Such responsibilities, Hymowitz continues, are no longer the norm in
American society. Rather, "[t]eenagers, as we came to call them after
World War II, are a very recent Western invention."255
C. College Publications as Public Forums
Applying the Hazelwood standard to college speech also proves
problematic in light of the public forum analysis. This is the case be-
cause the courts have consistently held that secondary school media
are not public forums, while college campuses have many more char-
part).
253 See Abrams & Goodman, supra note 109, at 728 (arguing that federal courts
likely will be reluctant to extend Hazelwood to college speech because "[college] stu-
dents are, in fact, young adults with full legal rights in our system (save, in most states,
the right to drink)"); Tenhoff, supra note 205, at 535 ("American society bestows upon
new adults full legal rights and responsibilities .. ").
254 Hymowitz, supra note 20, at 553-54.
255 Id. at 554.
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acteristics of a public forum. Central to the determination of the stu-
dents' First Amendment rights in Hazelwood, Kincaid, and similar cases
was whether the publications at issue were public forums. The type of
forum that a government entity has created determines to what extent
First Amendment rights are protected.
1. Three Types of Forums
The Supreme Court currently recognizes three types of forums, as
outlined in Peny Education Ass'n v. Peny Local Educators' Ass 2 5 6 Such
places as parks and streets, "places which by long tradition or by gov-
ernment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate," are tradi-
tional public forums.257 In such a forum, the government's permissi-
ble restrictions on speech are few. In order to restrict content-based
speech in a public forum, the government "must show that its regula-
tion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end."258 Furthermore, the government
"may also enforce regulation of the time, place, and manner of ex-
pression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication."259
The second type of forum is a "limited public forum," which con-
sists of public property that the government has opened on a limited
basis for expressive use by the public, even if it was not required to do
260so in the first place. In such a forum, the government can limit the
261
use to certain groups or certain subject matters. Once the govern-
ment has created a limited public forum, "it is bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum."262  As a result,
25 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
257 Id. at 45; see also id. (describing quintessential public forums as places that
"'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and.., have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discuss-
ing public questions'" (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939))).
258 Id.
259 Id.
2 6 Id. at 46.
261 See id. at 46 n.7 ("A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as
use by certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects." (citing Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981), upholding a state university's decision to prohibit the
use of university-provided meeting places for religious practice and worship; and City of
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976),
opening school board meetings to all citizens, including nonunion teachers, for the
discussion of school business)).
262 Id. at 46.
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"[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible
and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate
a compelling state interest."
263
The final type of forum is one that is "not held open to the gen-
eral public" and thus is a nonpublic forum.264 The Court has long
recognized that "[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or desig-
nation a forum for public communication" does not deserve the
heightened First Amendment protections provided to public and lim-
261ited public forums. In a nonpublic forum, the Court in Peny stated,
"the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes ... as long
as the regulation.., is reasonable and not an effort to suppress ex-
pression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."
266
217Time, place, and manner regulations are also permitted.. The Court
in Perry thus concluded that a forum is only made public if "by policy
or by practice" the government has opened the forum "for indis-
criminate use by the general public."
26 s
2. Public Forum Doctrine Applied to High School Publications
Confronted with these three public forum categories, the Court in
Hazelwood found the high school newspaper at issue to be a nonpublic
forum. The Court referred both to Perry and to Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.2 quoting Cornelius' statement
that "' [t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction
or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse.' 2 70 With those principles
in mind, the Hazelwood Court concluded for several reasons that the
high school did not intend to open the student newspaper for indis-
criminate use by the general public. First, the high school intended
the newspaper as a curricular experience, as evidenced by the high
school's curriculum guide and the active supervisory role played by
2711the newspaper's advisor. In addition, the Court rejected the argu-
263 Id.
264 Id. at 47.
265 Id. at 46.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 47.
269 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
270 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (quoting Cor-
nelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
271 See id. at 268 ("School officials did not deviate in practice from their policy that
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ments relying on the newspaper's statement of policy and on school
board policy, both of which asserted First Amendment rights. The
Court determined that the policies did not reflect an intent to extend
the First Amendment rights of a school-sponsored newspaper to those
provided to a public forum. 2 With these findings, the Court con-
cluded the high school did not intend to create a public forum with
the newspaper.27" As a result, the school's regulations were permissi-
ble .274
3. Hazelwood Doctrine Inapplicable to College Publications
Despite the conclusions reached in the initial Kincaid decisions,
the Hazelwood analysis does not apply appropriately to college publica-
tions. First and foremost, few courts ever have applied the public fo-
rum doctrine to college publications. 75 Moreover, of those few courts
applying the doctrine, even fewer, if any, ever have found a college
publication to be a nonpublic forum. 76 Indeed, it appears that most
courts simply have taken for granted that college publications are
open to the public for free expression. The court in Antonelli v.
Hammond, for example, stated:
The 'University setting of college-age students being exposed to a wide
range of intellectual experience creates a relatively mature marketplace
for the interchange of ideas so that the free speech clause of the First
Amendment with its underlying assumption that there is positive social
277
value in an open forum seems particularly appropriate.
Nonetheless, even if a court were to apply the public forum doc-
trine to college publications, as the courts in Kincaid did, the appro-
priate outcome would be a determination that the publication is a lim-
ited public forum, not a nonpublic forum. The central
determination, as it was in Hazelwood, is whether the government, that
is, the public university, intended the publication to be an open fo-
rum. In considering that intention, the Hazelwood Court relied in part
production of Spectrum was to be part of the educational curriculum and a 'regular
classroom activit[y]."' (italics added)).
272 Id. at 269.
273 Id. at 270.
274 Id. at 276.
275 Brief of Amici Curiae Student Press Law Center et al. at pt. ILA, Kincaid v.
Gibson, 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-5385), http://www.splc.org./
kincaidbrief.asp.
276 Id.
277 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 1970).
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on the fact that the high school newspaper was a curricular exercise.
By contrast, such is rarely the case at the college level. Indeed, "a
1997 study found that only one of the 101 daily college student news-
papers could be classified as 'strongly curriculum-based. 2 78  The
Court in Hazelwood also emphasized the fact that the newspaper was
tightly controlled by the high school through funding and oversight.
Once again, such is typically not the case for college publications.
Rather, most college publications are under the primary control of
students, with little or no oversight from college officials. In addition,
funding of college publications in many instances only comprises a
27'small portion of the publications' revenue. ) The court in Lueth. v. St.
Clair County Community College recognized such distinctions in deter-
mining that a student-run college newspaper, the Eric Square Gazette,
2810was a public forum. Contrasting the production of the college
newspaper with the production of the high school newspaper in Ha-
zelwood, the court in Lueth stated:
First, the Gazette does not operate in a "laboratory situation," in that the
Gazette is not operated under the guise of a specific academic course, and
exists under formal school policy as a student administered activity and
not within the defendant community college's "adopted curriculum."
Second, the Gazette is not created under the direction of a faculty mem-
ber, but is instead operated entirely by student participants, particularly
the Editor-in-Chief.2
Furthermore, common knowledge would suggest that college publica-
tions, especially newspapers and other widely distributed materials,
reach and interact with far more individuals than do high school pub-
lications. Indeed, college newspapers and yearbooks today are widely
acknowledged as outlets for student expression.282
Given these differences, the district court and vacated circuit
278
Brief of Amici Curiae at pt. II.A, Kincaid (No. 98-5385) (citing John v. Bodle,
The Instructional Independence of Daily Student Newspapers, JOURNALISM & MASS COMM.
EDUCATOR, Winter 1997, at 16).
270 See Tenhoff, supra note 205, at 514 (stating that the majority of a university
newspaper's funding comes from advertising revenue and explaining that some news-
papers only receive university funding when advertising revenue is insufficient).
280 See 732 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (citing the fact that the newspa-
per in question was "freely distributed throughout the local community, and [sought]
outside advertisers to aid in the funding of the paper's publication" as one of three fac-
tors relevant to determining that the paper was a forum for public expression).
281 Id.
282 See Brief of Amici Curiae at pt. lI.C, Kincaid (No. 98-5385) (discussing various
cases in which a college newspaper was recognized to be a public forum and arguing
that yearbooks should also be recognized as public forums).
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court opinions in Kincaid are fundamentally flawed. Both the district
court and the circuit court relied on Hazelwood to conclude that The
Thorobred was a nonpublic forum. As previously discussed, the circuit
court found sufficient evidence indicating KSU's intent to treat the
yearbook as a nonpublic forum. That evidence included the facts that
KSU's Student Handbook discussed the control the University has
over student publications and that the Handbook requires a dis-
claimer for the student newspaper, but not for the yearbook. At the
same time, the court found unconvincing the evidence offered by the
students attempting to establish the yearbook as a public forum.
Such a conclusion was inaccurate, first, because The Thorobred was
significantly different from the newspaper in Hazelwood. Specifically,
The Thorobred was produced by students on their own time as an extra-
curricular activity with no educational component attached. In addi-
tion, while the yearbook had a faculty advisor, that role was limited
and the primary responsibilities were left to the students8 3 Beyond
the specific facts surrounding The Thorobred, it bears repeating that
most college yearbooks are generally open to broad expression. Many
yearbooks, for example, include personal student messages from
graduating seniors, extensive coverage of both campus and world
news, and advertisements from throughout the community. The
Thorobred is no different. Indeed, one of the main reasons for its con-
fiscation was the inclusion of news coverage related not only to KSU
but also to the world. AsJudge Cole argued in his separate opinion:
A yearbook is a student publication constructed by students, intended
for students. It reflects their perspective of the college experience, evi-
denced, for example, by the fact that upperclasspersons are allowed to
include a personal caption with their individual class photograph, the
content of which may or may not be a "KSU-sponsored representation of
student life."284
Unlike his two colleagues who also ruled in Kincaid before the de-
cision was vacated, Judge Cole correctly argued that The Thorobred
should be treated as a limited public forum, a classification that the
majority ignored.25 Judge Cole criticized the majority's reliance on
the distinction KSU had made between the yearbook and the newspa-
per regarding disclaimers, arguing that "[i]t does not make sense to
283 See id. at pt. II.D (arguing that the "guidelines establish KSU's intent to give the
student full editorial control").
284 Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 731 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (Cole,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
285 Id. at 731 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2816infer the university's intent" from the distinction. In addition,Judge
Cole accurately noted that the University's Student Handbook re-
quired that any changes ordered by the University's Student Publica-
tions Advisor "'must deal only with the form or the time and manner
of expressions rather than alteration of its content.'-2 7  Such lan-
guage, Judge Cole emphasized, was remarkably similar to the defini-
tion in Perry of a limited public forum.
The Thorobred, like other college publications, is thus most aptly la-
beled a limited public forum. As a result, the University should have
been required to prove that its content-based regulations were nar-
rowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. The University's
offered reasons for the confiscation of the yearbooks would not have
met this standard. Indeed, the KSU officials made no contention that
the yearbooks were confiscated because they were obscene or because
they were likely to cause a substantial campus disruption, both of
which might be grounds for regulating a limited public forum.
Rather, the University relied primarily on objections to the yearbook's
content and on a perceived lack of quality.
219Such justifications do not suffice for First Amendment purposes.
Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, for example, rejected similar justi-
fications in Joyner v. Whitin' 0 and Schiff v. Williams,29' respectively. In
Joyner, the court held that a university could not withdraw financial
support of a student newspaper because it objected to the inclusion of/1• • 292
racially sensitive content in the publication. Similarly, the court in
Schiff prohibited a university's dismissal of the student editors of a
campus newspaper on the grounds that the newspaper was of poor
quality.29 3 Such holdings demonstrate that the federal courts have re-
quired significantly greater justifications for restricting free speech on
college campuses than in secondary schools.
286 Id. (Cole,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
287 Id. (Cole,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
288 Id. (Cole,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289 See Brief of Amici Curiae at pt. II.B, Kincaid (No. 98-5385) (discussing the ab-
sence of "'special circumstances' which would permit KSU to circumvent the constitu-
tionally-protected right of students" to engage in free speech).
477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
291 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975).
292 See 477 F.2d at 460 ("[1]f a college has a student newspaper, its publication
cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its editorial comment.").
2 See 519 F.2d at 261 (holding that technical errors in the newspaper were not
significantly related to the maintenance of order and discipline at the school, and thus
were insufficient to justify the actions taken).
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D. Potential Chilling Effect on College Campuses
Were the federal courts to restrict those First Amendment rights
on college campuses, nothing short of a chilling effect on diverse ex-
pression and academic freedom would result. The Student Press Law
Center already has established that the incidences of censorship in the
nation's secondary schools have increased significantly since Hazel-
wood. For instance, between 1988, the year of the Supreme Court's
Hazelwood decision, and the end of 1996, the number of inquiries to
the Student Press Law Center from public school student journalists
and their advisors rose 163 %.
29
4 Extending Hazelwood to college cam-
puses would have the same effect. Moreover, the ever expanding ap-
plication of Hazelwood in secondary schools could also occur on col-
lege campuses, resulting in regulation not only of college newspapers
and yearbooks, but also potentially of student theatrical productions,
college libraries and even faculty expression.
The federal courts have already allowed such restrictions in sec-
ondary schools. In Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County, for exam-
ple, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a school board's decision to ban two
books, Aristophanes' Lysitrata and Geoffrey Chaucer's The Miller's Tale,
from the school library because of their alleged "vulgarity and sexual
explicitness. "295 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Boring v. Buncombe
County Board of Education upheld a school administration's decision to
296
censor a teacher's selection of an extracurricular play. 6 The Su-
preme Court has appeared to recognize the danger in extending such
standards to college campuses. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the Court, in prohibiting the University of Vir-
ginia from refusing to fund the printing of a student religious news-
paper, stated:
Were the prohibition applied with much vigor at all, it would bar fund-
ing of essays by hypothetical student contributors named Plato, Spinoza,
and Descartes. And if the regulation covers, as the University says it
does, those student journalistic efforts that primarily manifest or pro-
mote a belief that there is no deity and no ultimate reality, then under-
graduates named Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre
would likewise have some of their major essays excluded from student
publications.297
24 Brief of Amici Curiae at pt. I.B.ii, Kincaid (No. 98-5385).
295 862 F.2d 1517,1518 (11th Cir. 1989).
296 136 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
297 515 U.S. 819, 836-37 (1995) (citation omitted).
19652002]
1966 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1915
Free speech regulations like those attempted in Rosenberger thus
undoubtedly would have a chilling effect on college campuses under a
Hazelwood standard. Indeed, the notion of a "marketplace of ideas" on
the nation's college campuses likely would be no more.
IV. CONCLUSION: LIKELIHOOD OF HAZELWOOD'S EXTENSION
The question remains whether the Supreme Court will extend Ha-
zelwood to universities. Support exists for both sides of the proposi-
tion. On one hand, such an extension is not all that implausible. In
the oft-cited footnote seven of its decision, the Hazelwood Court itself
acknowledged the possibility of extending its holding to college
speech: "We need not now decide whether the same degree of defer-
ence is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activi-
ties at the college and university level."29" Had the Court automatically
concluded that such an extension were inappropriate, it would be
logical to assume that the Court would not have included footnote
seven in its opinion. Instead, the inclusion of footnote seven seems to
suggest a possible extension to college speech.
Two other factors support this possibility. First, the Hazelwood
Court emphasized that the high school's censorship was permissible
because the regulated speech was "school-sponsored." Had the
speech not been associated with the high school, the school's actions
likely would not have passed constitutional muster. However, because
the newspaper was part of the school's curriculum and received fund-
ing from the school, the regulation was permissible. Should the Su-
preme Court put such an emphasis on similar "school sponsorship"
factors in another case, Hazelwood very likely could be extended to col-
lege speech. Such a result could occur because many forms of speech
on college campuses fit the Hazelwood definition of "school-sponsored"
expression. Many college newspapers, for example, receive some sort
of university funding. While most college newspapers rely heavily on
advertising revenue, some newspapers also receive financial support
through mandatory student activity fees79 Additionally, newspapers
at some colleges receive rent-free or reduced-rent use of university fa-
298 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 n.7 (1988).
299 For example, the college newspapers at issue in Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475
(4th Cir. '1983), Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983), and Joyner v. Whiting,
477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973), received funding through mandatory student activity
fees. See also Tenhoff, supra note 205, at 514 ("At some universities, student fees sup-
port the newspaper when advertising revenues fail to meet publishing costs.").
TRAMPLING THE "MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS"
cilities."°  Under the Hazelwood analysis, such school support con-
ceivably could turn material in college newspapers into "school-
sponsored" speech for First Amendment purposes.
The second means by which Hazelwood potentially could be ap-
plied to college speech is based on the Supreme Court's deference to
the decisions of public school officials. Under this rationale, were a
college to censor student speech, a court would be reluctant to inter-
vene because educators' decisions deserve "substantial deference."
30 1
That deference has a long history in the Court's jurisprudence. At
least as far back to 1968, the Court recognized: "By and large, public
education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and
which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional val-
ues." 302 While the Court has shown such deference to secondary
schools multiple times, the reasons for doing so, including the pre-
sumably greater knowledge of educational issues possessed by school
officials in comparison to the federal courts, would seem to apply to
administrative decisions at the college level as well.
Nonetheless, in order to apply Hazelwood to speech on college
campuses, the Supreme Court ostensibly would have to reject signifi-
cant precedent. Specifically, as discussed in Part III, the Court would
have to reconcile the vastly different approaches it has taken toward
free expression at the college level as opposed to the secondary school
levels. At the same time, the Court would have to address the funda-
mental differences between college students and secondary school
students. Finally, the Court would have to recognize the chilling ef-
fect the extension of Hazelwood could have on the "marketplace of
ideas" philosophy currently embedded in the nation's college cam-
puses. Whether the Supreme Court, or any other federal court, would
take those steps remains an open question. Perhaps, the Court
300 Tenhoff, supra note 205, at 514.
301 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7; see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) ("We previously have cautioned that
courts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent
and difficult questions of educational policy."' (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973))); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) ("It
is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators
which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.").
302 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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ultimately will answer Hazelwoods footnote seven in the negative, put-
ting a definitive end to such concern. Only then would colleges and
universities maintain their status as the country's "marketplace of
ideas."
